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ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy for a range of alternative economic models
in terms of a flexible inflation targeting rule, with a target criterion that depends on the model
specification. It shows which forecast horizons should matter, and which variables besides inflation
should be taken into account, for each specification.
The likely quantitative significance of the various factors considered in the general
discussion is then assessed by estimating a small, structural model of the U.S. monetary transmission
mechanism with explicit optimizing foundations. An optimal policy rule is computed for the
estimated model, and shown to correspond to a multi-stage inflation-forecast targeting procedure.
The degree to which actual U.S. policy over the past two decades has conformed to the optimal
target criteria is then considered.
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mg2190@columbia.edu woodford@princeton.eduAn increasingly popular approach to the conduct of monetary policy, since the early
1990s, has been inﬂation-forecast targeting. Under this general approach, a central bank is
committed to adjust short-term nominal interest rates periodically so as to ensure that its
projection for the economy’s evolution satisﬁes an explicit target criterion — for example, in
the case of the Bank of England, the requirement that the RPIX inﬂation rate be projected
to equal 2.5 percent at a horizon two years in the future (Vickers, 1998). Such a commitment
can overcome the inﬂationary bias that is likely to follow from discretionary policy guided
solely by a concern for social welfare, and can also help to stabilize medium-term inﬂation
expectations around a level that reduces the output cost to the economy of maintaining low
inﬂation.
Another beneﬁt that is claimed for such an approach (e.g., King, 1997; Bernanke et
al., 1999)— and an important advantage, at least in principle, of inﬂation targeting over
other policy rules, such as a k-percent rule for monetary growth, that should also achieve
a low average rate of inﬂation — is the possibility of combining reasonable stability of the
inﬂation rate (especially over the medium to long term) with optimal short-run responses
to real disturbances of various sorts. Hence Svensson (1999) argues for the desirability of
“ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting, by which it is meant1 that the target criterion involves not only
the projected path of the inﬂation rate, but one or more other variables, such as a measure
of the output gap, as well.
We here consider the question of what sort of additional variables ought to matter —
and with what weights, and what dynamic structure — in a target criterion that is intended
to implement optimal policy. We wish to use economic theory to address questions such as
which measure of inﬂation is most appropriately targeted (an index of goods prices only, or
wage inﬂation as well?), which sort of output gap, if any, should justify short-run departures
of projected inﬂation from the long-run target rate (a departure of real GDP from a smooth
1Svensson discusses two alternative speciﬁcations of an inﬂation-targeting policy rule, one of which (a
“general targeting rule”) involves speciﬁcation of a loss function that the central bank should use to evaluate
alternative paths for the economy, and the other of which (a “speciﬁc targeting rule”) involves speciﬁcation
of a target criterion. We are here concerned solely with policy prescriptions of the latter sort. On the
implementation of optimal policy through a “general targeting rule,” see Svensson and Woodford (2003).
1trend path, or from a “natural rate” that varies in response to a variety of disturbances?),
and how large a modiﬁcation of the acceptable inﬂation projection should result from a given
size of projected output gap. We also consider how far in the future the inﬂation and output
projections should extend upon which the current interest-rate decision is based, and the
degree to which an optimal target criterion should be history-dependent, i.e., should depend
on recent conditions, and not simply on the projected paths of inﬂation and other target
variables from now on.
In a recent paper (Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a), we expound a general approach
to the design of an optimal target criterion. We show, for a fairly general class of linear-
quadratic policy problems, how it is possible to choose a target criterion that will satisfy
several desiderata. First, the target criterion has the property that insofar as the central
bank is expected to ensure that it holds at all times, this expectation will imply the existence
of a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. Second, that equilibrium will be optimal,
from the point of view of a speciﬁed quadratic loss function, among all possible rational-
expectations equilibria, given one’s model of the monetary transmission mechanism.2 Thus
the policy rule implements the optimal state-contingent evolution of the economy, in the
sense of giving it a reason to occur if the private sector is convinced of the central bank’s
commitment to the rule and fully understands its implications.
Third, the rule is robustly optimal, in the sense that the same target criterion brings about
an optimal state-contingent evolution of the economy regardless of the assumed statistical
properties of the exogenous disturbances, despite the fact that the target criterion makes
no explicit reference to the particular types of disturbances that may occur (except insofar
as these may be involved in the deﬁnition of the target variables — the variables appearing
2Technically, the state-contingent evolution that is implemented by commitment to the policy rule is
optimal from a “timeless perspective” of the kind proposed in Woodford (1999b), which means that it would
have been chosen as part of an optimal commitment at a date suﬃciently far in the past for the policymaker
to fully internalize the implications of the anticipation of the speciﬁed policy actions, as well as their eﬀects
at the time that they are taken. This modiﬁcation of the concept of optimality typically used in Ramsey-
style analyses of optimal policy commitments allows a time-invariant policy rule to be judged optimal, and
eliminates the time inconsistency of optimal policy. See Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) and Svensson and
Woodford (2003) for further discussion.
2in the loss function which deﬁnes the stabilization objectives). This robustness greatly
increases the practical interest in the computation of a target criterion that is intended
to implement optimal state-contingent responses to disturbances; for actual economies are
aﬀected by an innumerable variety of types of disturbances, and central banks always have
a great deal of speciﬁc information about the ones that have most recently occurred. The
demand that the target criterion be robustly optimal also allows us to obtain much sharper
conclusions as to the form of an optimal target criterion. For while there would be a very
large number of alternative relations among the paths of inﬂation and other variables that
are equally consistent with the optimal state-contingent evolution in the case of a particular
type of assumed disturbances, only relations of a very special sort continue to describe
the optimal state-contingent evolution even if one changes the assumed character of the
exogenous disturbances aﬀecting the economy.
Our general characterization in Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) is in terms of a fairly
abstract notation, involving eigenvectors and matrix lag polynomials. Here we oﬀer examples
of the speciﬁc character of the optimally ﬂexible inﬂation targets that can be derived using
that theory. Our results are of two sorts. First, we illustrate the implications of the theory in
the context of a series of simple models that incorporate important features of realistic models
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Such features include wage and price stickiness,
inﬂation inertia, habit persistence, and predeterminedness of pricing and spending decisions.
In the models considered, there is a tension between two or more of the central bank’s
stabilization objectives, that cannot simultaneously be achieved in full; in the simplest case,
this is a tension between inﬂation and output-gap stabilization, but we also consider models
in which it is reasonable to seek to stabilize interest rates or wage inﬂation as well. These
results in the context of very simple models are intended to give insight into the way in which
the character of the optimal target criterion should depend on one’s model of the economy,
and should be of interest even to readers who are not persuaded of the empirical realism of
our estimated model.
Second, we apply the theory to a small quantitative model of the U.S. monetary transmis-
3sion mechanism, the numerical parameters of which are ﬁt to VAR estimates of the impulse
responses of several aggregate variables to identiﬁed monetary policy shocks. While the
model remains an extremely simple one, this exercise makes an attempt to judge the likely
quantitative signiﬁcance of the types of eﬀects that have previously been discussed in more
general terms. It also oﬀers a tentative evaluation of the extent to which U.S. policy over the
past two decades has diﬀered from what an optimal inﬂation-targeting regime would have
called for.
1 Model Speciﬁcation and Optimal Targets
Here we oﬀer a few simple examples of the way in which the optimal target criterion will
depend on the details of one’s model of the monetary transmission mechanism. (The optimal
target criterion also depends, of course, on one’s assumed stabilization objectives. But
here we shall take the view that the appropriate stabilization objectives follow from ones
assumptions about the way in which policy aﬀects the economy, though the welfare-theoretic
stabilization objectives implied by our various simple models are here simply asserted rather
than derived.) The examples that we select illustrate the consequences of features that are
often present in quantitative optimizing models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
They are also features of the small quantitative model presented in section 2; hence our
analytical results in this section are intended to provide intuition for the numerical results
presented for the empirical model in section 3.
The analysis of Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) derives a robustly optimal target crite-
rion from the ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize the optimal state-contingent evolution
of the economy. Here we illustrate this method by directly applying it to our simple examples,
without any need to recapitulate the general theory.
1.1 An Inﬂation-Output Stabilization Tradeoﬀ
We ﬁrst consider the central issue addressed in previous literature on ﬂexible inﬂation target-
ing, which is the extent to which a departure from complete (and immediate) stabilization of
4inﬂation is justiﬁable in the case of real disturbances that prevent joint stabilization of both
inﬂation and the (welfare-relevant) output gap.3 We illustrate how this question would be
answered in the case of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission mechanism
that allows for the existence of such “cost-push shocks” (to use the language of Clarida et
al., 1999).
As is well known, a discrete-time version of the optimizing model of staggered price-
setting proposed by Calvo (1983) results in a log-linear aggregate supply relation of the
form
¼t = ·xt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; (1.1)
sometimes called the “New Keynesian Phillips curve” (after Roberts, 1995).4 Here ¼t denotes
the inﬂation rate (rate of change of a general index of goods prices), xt the output gap (the
deviation of log real GDP from a time-varying “natural rate”, deﬁned so that stabilization of
the output gap is part of the welfare-theoretic stabilization objective5), and the disturbance
term ut is a “cost-push shock”, collecting all of the exogenous shifts in the equilibrium relation
between inﬂation and output that do not correspond to shifts in the welfare-relevant “natural
rate” of output. In addition, 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor of the representative household,
and · > 0 is a function of a number of features of the underlying structure, including both
the average frequency of price adjustment and the degree to which Ball-Romer (1990) “real
rigidities” are important.
We shall assume that the objective of monetary policy is to minimize the expected value
3Possible sources of disturbances of this sort are discussed in Giannoni (2000), Steinsson (2002), and
Woodford (2003, chap. 6).
4See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for a derivation in the context of an explicit intertemporal general equi-
librium model of the transmission mechanism. Equation (1.1) represents merely a log-linear approximation
to the exact equilibrium relation between inﬂation and output implied by this pricing model; however, un-
der circumstances discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6), such an approximation suﬃces for a log-linear
approximate characterization of the optimal responses of inﬂation and output to small enough disturbances.
Similar remarks apply to the other log-linear models presented below.
5See Woodford (2003, chaps. 3 and 6) for discussion of how this variable responds to a variety of types of
real disturbances. Under conditions discussed in chapter 6, the “natural rate” referred to here corresponds
to the equilibrium level of output in the case that all wages and prices were completely ﬂexible. However,
our results in this section apply to a broader class of model speciﬁcations, under an appropriate deﬁnition
of the “output gap”.








where the discount factor ¯ is the same as in (1.1), and the loss each period is given by
Lt = ¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2; (1.3)
for a certain relative weight ¸ > 0 and optimal level of the output gap x¤ > 0: Under
the same microfoundations as justify the structural relation (1.1), one can show (Woodford,
2003, chap. 6) that a quadratic approximation to the expected utility of the representative
household is a decreasing function of (1.2), with
¸ = ·=µ (1.4)
(where µ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between alternative diﬀerentiated goods) and
x¤ a function of both the degree of market power and the size of tax distortions. However,
we here oﬀer an analysis of the optimal target criterion in the case of any loss function of
the form (1.3), regardless of whether the weights and target values are the ones that can be
justiﬁed on welfare-theoretic grounds or not. (In fact, a quadratic loss function of this form
is frequently assumed in the literature on monetary policy evaluation, and is often supposed
to represent the primary stabilization objectives of actual inﬂation-targeting central banks
in positive characterizations of the consequences of inﬂation targeting.)
The presence of disturbances of the kind represented by ut in (1.1) creates a tension
between the two stabilization goals reﬂected in (1.3) of inﬂation stabilization on the one hand
and output-gap stabilization (around the value x¤) on the other; under an optimal policy,
the paths of both variables will be aﬀected by cost-push shocks. The optimal responses
can be found by computing the state-contingent paths f¼t;xtg that minimize (1.2) with loss
function (1.3) subject to the sequence of constraints (1.1).6 The Lagrangian for this problem,
6Note that the aggregate-demand side of the model does not matter, as long as a nominal interest-rate
path exists that is consistent with any inﬂation and output paths that may be selected. This is true if, for
example, the relation between interest rates and private expenditure is of the form (1.15) assumed below, and
the required path of nominal interest rates is always non-negative. We assume here that the non-negativity
constraint never binds, which will be true, under the assumptions of the model, in the case of any small
enough real disturbances fut;rn
t g.










t + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2] + 't[¼t ¡ ·xt ¡ ¯¼t+1]
¾
; (1.5)
where 't is a Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (1.1) on the possible inﬂation-
output pairs in period t. In writing the constraint term associated with the period t AS
relation, it does not matter that we substitute ¼t+1 for Et¼t+1; for it is only the conditional
expectation of the term at date t0 that matters in (1.5), and the law of iterated expectations
implies that
Et0['tEt¼t+1] = Et0[Et('t¼t+1)] = Et0['t¼t+1]
for any t ¸ t0:
Diﬀerentiating (1.5) with respect to the levels of inﬂation and output each period, we
obtain a pair of ﬁrst-order conditions
¼t + 't ¡ 't¡1 = 0; (1.6)
¸(xt ¡ x
¤) ¡ ·'t = 0; (1.7)
for each period t ¸ t0: These conditions, together with the structural relation (1.1), have
a unique non-explosive solution7 for the inﬂation rate, the output gap, and the Lagrange
multiplier (a unique solution in which the paths of these variables are bounded if the shocks
ut are bounded), and this solution (which therefore satisﬁes the transversality condition)
indicates the optimal state-contingent evolution of inﬂation and output.
As an example, Figure 1, plots the impulse responses to a positive cost-push shock, in
the simple case that the cost-push shock is purely transitory, and unforecastable before the
period in which it occurs (so that Etut+j = 0 for all j ¸ 1). Here the assumed values of ¯;·;
7Obtaining a unique solution requires the speciﬁcation of an initial value for the Lagrange multiplier 't0¡1:
See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for the discussion of alternative possible choices of this initial condition and
their signiﬁcance. Here we note simply that regardless of the value chosen for 't0¡1; the optimal responses
to cost-push shocks in period t0 and later are the same.




















Figure 1: Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock under commitment, in the case
of Calvo pricing.
and ¸ are those given in Table 1,8 and the shock in period zero is of size u0 = 1; the periods
represent quarters, and the inﬂation rate is plotted as an annualized rate, meaning that
what is plotted is actually 4¼t: As one might expect, in an optimal equilibrium inﬂation is
allowed to increase somewhat in response to a cost-push shock, so that the output gap need
not fall as much as would be required to prevent any increase in the inﬂation rate. Perhaps
less intuitively, the ﬁgure also shows that under an optimal commitment, monetary policy
remains tight even after the disturbance has dissipated, so that the output gap returns to
8These parameter values are based on the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for a slightly
more complex variant of the model used here and in section 1.3. The coeﬃcient ¸ here corresponds to ¸x in
the table. Note also that the value of .003 for that coeﬃcient refers to a loss function in which ¼t represents
the quarterly change in the log price level. If we write the loss function in terms of an annualized inﬂation
rate, 4¼t; as is conventional in numerical work, then the relative weight on the output-gap stabilization term
would actually be 16¸x; or about .048. Of course, this is still quite low compared the relative weights often
assumed in the ad hoc stabilization objectives used in the literature on the evaluation of monetary policy
rules.













zero only much more gradually. As a result of this, while inﬂation overshoots its long-run
target value at the time of the shock, it is held below its long-run target value for a time
following the shock, so that the unexpected increase in prices is subsequently undone. In
fact, as the bottom panel of the ﬁgure shows, under an optimal commitment, the price level
eventually returns to exactly the same path that it would have been expected to follow if
the shock had not occurred.
This simple example illustrates a very general feature of optimal policy once one takes
account of forward-looking private-sector behavior: optimal policy is almost always history-
dependent. That is, it depends on the economy’s recent history and not simply on the set
of possible state-contingent paths for the target variables (here, inﬂation and the output
gap) that are possible from now on. (In the example shown in the ﬁgure, the set of pos-
sible rational-expectations equilibrium paths for inﬂation and output from period t onward
depends only on the value of ut; but under an optimal policy, the actually realized inﬂation
rate and output gap depend on past disturbances as well.) This is because a commitment to
respond later to past conditions can shift expectations at the earlier date in a way that helps
to achieve the central bank’s stabilization objectives. In the present example, if price-setters
are forward-looking, the anticipation that a current increase in the general price level will
9predictably be “undone” soon gives suppliers a reason not to increase their own prices cur-
rently as much as they otherwise would. This leads to smaller equilibrium deviations from
the long-run inﬂation target at the time of the cost-push shock, without requiring such a
large change in the output gap as would be required to stabilize inﬂation to the same degree
without a change in expectations regarding future inﬂation. (The impulse responses under
the best possible equilibrium that does not involve history-dependence are shown by the
dashed lines in the ﬁgure.9 Note that a larger initial output contraction is required, even
though both the initial price increase and the long-run price increase caused by the shock
are greater.)
It follows that no purely forward-looking target criterion — one that involves only the
projected paths of the target variables from the present time onward, like the criterion that
is oﬃcially used by the Bank of England — can possibly determine an equilibrium with the
optimal responses to disturbances. Instead, a history-dependent target criterion is necessary,
as stressed by Svensson and Woodford (2003).
A target criterion that works is easily derived from the ﬁrst-order conditions (1.6) – (1.7).
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, one is left with a linear relation
¼t + Á(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0; (1.8)
with a coeﬃcient Á = ¸=· > 0; that the state-contingent evolution of inﬂation and the output
gap must satisfy. Note that this relation must hold in an optimal equilibrium regardless of
the assumed statistical properties of the disturbances. One can also show that a commitment
to ensure that (1.8) holds each period from some date t0 onward implies the existence of a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium,10 given any initial output gap xt0¡1. In this
equilibrium, inﬂation and output evolve according to the optimal state-contingent evolution
9See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for derivation of this “optimal non-inertial plan.” In the example shown in
Figure 1, this optimal non-inertial policy corresponds to the Markov equilibrium resulting from discretionary
optimization by the central bank. That equivalence would not obtain, however, in the case of serially
correlated disturbances.
10The characteristic equation that determines whether the system of equations consisting of (1.1) and (1.8)
has a unique non-explosive solution is the same as for the system of equations solved above for the optimal
state-contingent evolution.
10characterized above.
This is the optimal target criterion that we are looking for: it indicates that deviations of
the projected inﬂation rate ¼t from the long-run inﬂation target (here equal to zero) should
be accepted that are proportional to the degree to which the output gap is projected to
decline over the same period that prices are projected to rise. Note that this criterion is
history-dependent, because the acceptability of a given projection (¼t;xt) depends on the
recent past level of the output gap; it is this feature of the criterion that will result in the
output gap’s returning only gradually to its normal level following a transitory cost-push
shock, as shown in Figure 1.
How much of a projected change in the output gap is needed to justify a given degree
of departure from the long-run inﬂation target? If ¸ is assigned the value that it takes in
the welfare-theoretic loss function, then Á = µ
¡1; where µ is the elasticity of demand faced
by the typical ﬁrm. The calibrated value for this parameter given in Table 1 (based on the
estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997) implies that Á = :13: If we express the target
criterion in terms of the annualized inﬂation rate (4¼t) rather than the quarterly rate of price
change, the relative weight on the projected quarterly change in the output gap will instead
be 4Á; or about 0.51. Hence a projection of a decline in real GDP of two percentage points
relative to the natural rate of output over the coming quarter would justify an increase in
the projected (annualized) rate of inﬂation of slightly more than one percentage point.
1.2 Inﬂation Inertia
A feature of the “New Keynesian” aggregate-supply relation (1.1) that has come in for
substantial criticism in the empirical literature is the fact that past inﬂation rates play no
role in the determination of current equilibrium inﬂation. Instead, empirical models of the
kind used in central banks for policy evaluation often imply that the path of the output
gap required in order to achieve a particular path for the inﬂation rate from now onward
depends on what rate of inﬂation has already been recently experienced; and this aspect
of one’s model is of obvious importance for the question of how rapidly one should expect
11that it is optimal to return inﬂation to its normal level, or even to “undo” past unexpected
price-level increases, following a cost-push shock.
A simple way of incorporating inﬂation inertia of the kind that central-bank models
often assume into an optimizing model of pricing behavior is to assume, as Christiano et
al. (2001) propose, that individual prices are indexed to an aggregate price index during
the intervals between re-optimizations of the individual prices, and that the aggregate price
index becomes available for this purpose only with a one-period lag. When the Calvo model
of staggered price-setting is modiﬁed in this way, the aggregate-supply relation (1.1) takes
the more general form11
¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 = ·xt + ¯Et[¼t+1 ¡ °¼t] + ut; (1.9)
where the coeﬃcient 0 · ° · 1 indicates the degree of automatic indexation to the aggregate
price index. In the limiting case of complete indexation (° = 1), the case assumed by
Christiano et al. and the case found to best ﬁt US data in our own estimation results below,
this relation is essentially identical to the aggregate-supply relation proposed by Fuhrer and
Moore (1995), which has been widely used in empirical work.
The welfare-theoretic stabilization objective corresponding to this alternative structural
model is of the form (1.2) with the period loss function (1.3) replaced by
Lt = (¼t ¡ °¼t¡1)
2 + ¸(xt ¡ x
¤)
2; (1.10)
where ¸ > 0 is again given by (1.4), and x¤ > 0 is similarly the same function of underlying
microeconomic distortions as before.12 (The reason for the change is that with the automatic
indexation, the degree to which the prices of ﬁrms that re-optimize their prices and those
that do not are diﬀerent depends on the degree to which the current overall inﬂation rate
¼t diﬀers from the rate at which the automatically adjusted prices are increasing, i.e., from
°¼t¡1:) If we consider the problem of minimizing (1.2) with loss function (1.10) subject to
11See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for a derivation from explicit microeconomic foundations.
12See Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for derivation of this loss function as an approximation to expected utility.
























Figure 2: Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock under commitment, for alternative
degrees of inﬂation inertia.
the sequence of constraints (1.9), the problem has the same form as in the previous section,
except with ¼t everywhere replaced by the quasi-diﬀerenced inﬂation rate
¼
qd
t ´ ¼t ¡ °¼t¡1: (1.11)
The solution is therefore also the same, with this substitution.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of inﬂation, the output gap, and the price level to
the same kind of disturbance as in Figure 1, under optimal policy for economies with alter-
native values of the indexation parameter °: (The values assumed for ¯;·; and ¸ are again
as in Table 1.) Once again, under an optimal commitment, the initial unexpected increase
in prices is eventually undone, as long as ° < 1; and this once again means that inﬂation
eventually undershoots its long-run level for a time. However, for any large enough value
of °; inﬂation remains greater than its long-run level for a time even after the disturbance
13has ceased, and only later undershoots its long-run level; and the larger is °; the longer this
period of above-average inﬂation persists. In the limiting case that ° = 1; the undershooting
never occurs; inﬂation is simply gradually brought back to the long-run target level.13 In
this last case, a temporary disturbance causes a permanent change in the price level, even
under optimal policy. However, the inﬂation rate is eventually restored to its previously
anticipated long-run level under an optimal commitment, even though the rate of inﬂation
(as opposed to the rate of acceleration of inﬂation) is not welfare-relevant in this model.
(Note that the optimal responses shown in Figure 2 for the case ° = 1 correspond fairly well
to the conventional wisdom of inﬂation-targeting central banks; but our theoretical analysis
allows us to compute an optimal rate at which inﬂation should be projected to return to its
long-run target value following a disturbance.)
As in the previous section, we can derive a target criterion that implements the optimal
responses to disturbances regardless of the assumed statistical properties of the disturbances.
This optimal target criterion is obtained by replacing ¼t in (1.8) by ¼
qd
t ; yielding
¼t ¡ °¼t¡1 + Á(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0; (1.12)
where Á > 0 is the same function of model parameters as before. This indicates that the
acceptable inﬂation projection for the current period should depend not only on the projected
change in the output gap, but also (insofar as ° > 0) on the recent past rate of inﬂation: a
higher existing inﬂation rate justiﬁes a higher projected near-term inﬂation rate, in the case
of any given output-gap projection.
In the special case that ° = 1; the optimal target criterion adjusts the current inﬂation
target one-for-one with increases in the existing rate of inﬂation — the target criterion
actually involves only the rate of acceleration of inﬂation. But this does not mean that
disturbances are allowed to permanently shift the inﬂation rate to a new level, as shown in
Figure 2. In fact, in the case of full indexation, an alternative target criterion that also leads
13Note that the impulse response of inﬂation (for ° = 1) in panel 1 of Figure 2 is the same as the impulse
response of the price level (under optimal policy) in panel 3 of Figure 1. The scales are diﬀerent because the
inﬂation rate plotted is an annualized rate, 4¼t rather than ¼t.
14to the optimal equilibrium responses to cost-push shocks is the simpler criterion
¼t + Áxt = ¯ ¼; (1.13)
where again Á > 0 is the same coeﬃcient as in (1.12), and the value of the long-run inﬂation
target ¯ ¼ is arbitrary (but not changing over time). Note that (1.12) is just a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced
form of (1.13), and a commitment to ensure that (1.12) holds in each period t ¸ t0 is
equivalent to a commitment to ensure that (1.13) holds, for a particular choice of ¯ ¼; namely
¯ ¼ = ¼t0¡1+Áxt0¡1: But the choice of ¯ ¼ has no eﬀect on either the determinacy of equilibrium
or the equilibrium responses of inﬂation and output to real disturbances (only on the long-
run average inﬂation rate), and so any target criterion of the form (1.13) implements the
optimal responses to disturbances.14 Note that this optimal target criterion is similar in form
to the kind that Svensson (1999) suggests as a description of the behavior of actual inﬂation-
targeting central banks, except that the inﬂation and output-gap projections in (1.13) are
not so far in the future (they refer only to the coming quarter) as in the procedures of actual
inﬂation targeters.
The result that the long-run inﬂation target associated with an optimal target criterion
is indeterminate depends, of course, on the fact that we have assumed a model in which
no distortions depend on the inﬂation rate, as opposed to its rate of change. This is log-
ically possible, but unlikely to be true in reality. (Distortions that depend on the level of
nominal interest rates, considered in the next section, would be one example of a realistic
complication that would break this result, even in the case of full indexation.) Because the
model considered here with ° = 1 does not determine any particular optimal long-run inﬂa-
tion target (it need not vary with the initially existing inﬂation rate, for example), even a
small perturbation of these assumptions is likely to determine an optimal long-run inﬂation
14Any such policy rule is also optimal from a timeless perspective, under the deﬁnition given in Giannoni
and Woodford (2002a). Note that alternative rules, that result in equilibria that diﬀer only in a transitory,
deterministic component of the path of each of the target variables, can each be considered optimal in this
sense. This ambiguity as to the initial behavior of the target variables cannot be resolved if our concept of
optimal policy is to be time-consistent. In the present case, ambiguity about the required initial behavior
of the target variable, inﬂation acceleration, implies ambiguity about the required long-run average level of
the inﬂation rate, though there is no ambiguity about how inﬂation should respond to shocks.
15target, and this will generally be independent of the initially existing rate of inﬂation. (The
monetary frictions considered in the next subsection provide an example of this.)
It is worth noting that even though the optimal dynamic responses shown in Figure 2
for the case of large ° conﬁrm the conventional wisdom of inﬂation-targeting central bankers
with regard the desirability of a gradual return of the inﬂation rate to its long-run target level
following a cost-push shock, the optimal target criterion for this model does not involve a
“medium-term” inﬂation forecast rather than a shorter-run projection. Even in the case that
we suppose that the central bank will often have advance information about disturbances
that will shift the aggregate-supply relation only a year or more in the future, the robust
description of optimal policy is one that indicates how short-run output-gap projections
should modify the acceptable short-run inﬂation projection, rather than one that checks
only that some more distant inﬂation forecast is still on track. Of course, a commitment to
the achievement of the target criterion (1.12) each period does imply that the projection of
inﬂation several quarters in the future should never depart much from the long-run inﬂation
target; but the latter stipulation is not an equally useful guide to what should actually be
done with interest rates at a given point in time.
1.3 An Interest-Rate Stabilization Objective
The policy problems considered above assume that central banks care only about the paths
of inﬂation and the output gap, and not about the behavior of nominal interest rates that
may be required to bring about a given evolution of inﬂation and output that is consistent
with the aggregate-supply relation. However, actual central banks generally appear to care
about reducing the volatility of nominal interest rates as well (Goodfriend, 1991). Such a
concern can also be justiﬁed in terms of microeconomic foundations that are consistent with
the kind of aggregate-supply relations assumed above, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap.
6).
For example, the transactions frictions that account for money demand imply a distortion
that should be an increasing function of the nominal interest rate, as stressed by Friedman
16(1969); the deadweight loss resulting from a positive opportunity cost of holding money
should also be a convex function of the interest rate, at least for interest rates close enough
to the optimal one (the interest rate paid on base money). Alternatively, the existence of a
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can make it desirable to accept somewhat greater
variability of inﬂation and the output gap for the sake of reducing the required variability of
nominal interest rates, given that the smaller range of variation in the nominal interest rate
allows the average nominal interest rate (and hence the average inﬂation rate) to be lower.
A quadratic penalty for deviations of the nominal interest rate from a target level may then
be justiﬁed as a proxy for a constraint that links the feasible average level of nominal interest
rates to the variability of the nominal interest rate.




t + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2; (1.14)
where ¸x > 0 is the same function of underlying parameters as ¸ in (1.3), it is a short-term
nominal interest rate, ¸i > 0 for one of the reasons discussed above, and i¤ is the level around
which the nominal interest rate would ideally be stabilized. In this case, the aggregate-supply
relation is not the only relevant constraint in our optimal policy problem; it also matters
what interest-rate path is required in order to induce a given evolution of aggregate demand.
In a simple optimizing model that has been used in many recent analyses of optimal
monetary policy (e.g., McCallum and Nelson, 1999; Clarida et al., 1999; and Woodford,
1999a), the aggregate-supply relation (1.1) is combined with an intertemporal Euler equation
for the timing of private expenditure of the form
xt = Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(it ¡ Et¼t+1 ¡ r
n
t ); (1.15)
where ¾ > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and rn
t exogenous variation
in Wicksell’s “natural rate of interest.” Real disturbances that cause the natural rate of
interest to vary are now another reason why (if ¸i > 0) it will be impossible for the central
bank to completely stabilize all of its target variables simultaneously, and hence for transitory

























Figure 3: Optimal responses to an increase in the natural rate of interest.
variations in the inﬂation rate to be optimal, even in the absence of cost-push shocks.
This leads us to consider the problem of ﬁnding the state-contingent evolution of inﬂation,
output and interest rates to minimize the expected discounted value of (1.14) subject to the
constraints (1.1) and (1.15). A similar Lagrangian method as in section 1.1 leads to ﬁrst-
order conditions of the form
¼t ¡ ¯
¡1¾'1t¡1 + '2t ¡ '2t¡1 = 0; (1.16)
¸x(xt ¡ x
¤) + '1t ¡ ¯
¡1'1t¡1 ¡ ·'2t = 0; (1.17)
¸i(it ¡ i
¤) + ¾'1t = 0; (1.18)
18where '1t is the multiplier associated with constraint (1.15) and '2t the one associated with
constraint (1.1). We can once again solve this system of equations for unique bounded
paths for the endogenous variables in the case of any bounded processes for the exogenous
disturbances frn
t ;utg. The implied optimal responses to an exogenous increase in the natural
rate of interest are shown in Figure 3. Here the model parameters are calibrated as in Table
1, and the natural rate of interest is assumed to be a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with
serial correlation coeﬃcient ½r = 0:35:15
A notable feature of Figure 3 is that once again optimal policy must be history-dependent,
for the optimal responses to the disturbance are more persistent than the disturbance itself.
As discussed in Woodford (1999a), optimal interest-rate policy is inertial, in the sense that
interest rates are both raised only gradually in response to an increase in the natural rate
of interest, and then returned to their normal level more gradually than the natural rate
itself as well. (The impulse response of the natural rate is shown by the dotted line in panel
1 of the ﬁgure.) Because spending responds to expected future interest rates and not only
current short rates, it is possible to achieve a given degree of stabilization of demand (relative
to the natural rate) in response to disturbances with less volatility of short-term interest
rates if short rates are moved in a more inertial fashion. (The optimal responses among
those achievable using a purely forward-looking target criterion are shown, for purposes of
comparison, by the dashed lines in the ﬁgure.)
A history-dependent target criterion that can bring about the desired impulse responses,
again regardless of the statistical properties of the disturbances rn
t and ut (including any
assumptions about the degree of correlation between these disturbances), can be derived
once more from the ﬁrst-order conditions (1.16) – (1.18). Using the last two equations to
substitute for the two Lagrange multipliers in the ﬁrst equation, we are left with a linear
15The real disturbances that cause the natural rate of interest to vary are assumed to create no variation in
the cost-push term ut; that is, they shift the equilibrium relation between inﬂation and output only through
possible shifts in the natural rate of output. A variety of examples of real disturbances with this property
are discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6).
19relation of the form
A(L)(it ¡ i
¤) = Á¼¼t + Áx(xt ¡ xt¡1) (1.19)
that must be satisﬁed each period under an optimal policy. Here the coeﬃcients of the lag
polynomial are
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One can furthermore show that this is not only a necessary feature of an optimal equilibrium,
but also suﬃces to characterize it, in the sense that the system consisting of equation (1.19)
together with the structural equations (1.1) and (1.15) has a unique non-explosive solution,
in which the equilibrium responses to shocks are optimal.16
Requirement (1.19) can be interpreted as an inertial Taylor rule, as discussed in Giannoni
and Woodford (2002b). However, this requirement can also be equivalently expressed in a
forward-integrated form, that more directly generalizes the optimal target criterion derived
in section 1.1. It is easily seen that our sign assumptions on the model parameters imply
that A(L) can be factored as
A(L) ´ (1 ¡ ¸1 L)(1 ¡ ¸2 L);
where 0 < ¸1 < 1 < ¸2: It then follows that (1.19) is equivalent to
(1 ¡ ¸1L)(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) = ¡¸
¡1




¡1(Á¼¼t + Áx∆xt)]; (1.21)
in the sense that bounded stochastic processes fit;¼t;xtg satisfy (1.19) for all t ¸ t0 if and
only if they satisfy (1.21) for all t ¸ t0:17 Hence a commitment to ensure that (1.21) is satisﬁed
at all times implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium in which the responses to
shocks are optimal. This conclusion is once again independent of any assumption about the
statistical properties of the disturbances, so that (1.21) is a robustly optimal target criterion.
16See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), Proposition 6.
17See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), Proposition 7.
20This optimal target criterion can be expressed in the form
Ft(¼) + ÁFt(x) = µxxt¡1 ¡ µi(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1; (1.22)





involving weights f®z;jg that sum to one. Thus the criterion speciﬁes a time-varying target
value for a weighted average of an inﬂation forecast and an output-gap forecast, where each
of these forecasts is in fact a weighted average of forecasts at various horizons, rather than a
projection for a speciﬁc future date. The coeﬃcients of this representation of optimal policy
are given by


















while the optimal weights in the conditional forecasts are





Thus the optimal conditional forecast is one that places positive weight on the projection for
each future period, beginning with the current period, with weights that decline exponentially
as the horizon increases. The mean distance in the future of the projections that are relevant
to the target criterion is equal to
1 X
j=0
®z;jj = (¸2 ¡ 1)
¡1
for both the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts.
21In the case of the calibrated parameter values in Table 1, the rate at which these weights
decay per quarter is ¸
¡1
2 = :68, so that the mean forecast horizon in the optimal target
criterion is 2.1 quarters. Thus while the optimal target criterion in this case involves pro-
jections of inﬂation and output beyond the current quarter, the forecast horizon remains
quite short compared to the actual practice of inﬂation forecast-targeting central banks.
For these same parameter values, the optimal relative weight on the output-gap forecast is
Á = :04;18 indicating that the target criterion is largely an inﬂation target. The remaining
optimal coeﬃcients are µx = :04;µi = :24; and µ∆ = :51; indicating a substantial degree of
history-dependence of the optimal ﬂexible inﬂation target. The fact that µx = Á indicates
that it is the forecasted increase in the output gap relative to the previous quarter’s level,
rather than the absolute level of the gap, that should modify the inﬂation target, just as in
section 1.1. The signs of µi and µ∆ imply that policy will be made tighter (in the sense of
demanding a lower modiﬁed inﬂation forecast) when interest rates have been high and/or
increasing in the recent past; this is a way of committing to interest-rate inertia of the kind
shown in Figure 3.
Note that in the limiting case in which ¸i = 0; this target criterion reduces to (1.8). In
that limit, µi, µ∆ and the decay factor ¸
¡1
2 become equal to zero, while Á and µx have a
well-deﬁned (common) positive limit. Thus in this limiting case, the optimal targeting rule
is one in which the inﬂation target must be modiﬁed in proportion to the projected change in
the output gap, but it is no longer also dependent on lagged interest rates, and the relevant
inﬂation and output-gap projections do not involve periods beyond the current one. This
will also be nearly true in the case of small enough positive values of ¸i:
We may similarly introduce an interest-rate stabilization objective in the case of the
model with inﬂation inertia considered in section 1.2. In this case, the loss function (1.10)
is generalized to
Lt = (¼t ¡ °¼t¡1)
2 + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2; (1.23)
18If we write the target criterion in terms of a forecast for the annualized inﬂation rate (4¼t), the relative
weight on the output-gap forecast will instead be 4Á; or about .15.
22for some ¸i > 0 and some desired interest rate i¤: In this generalization of the problem just






¡1¾'1t¡1 ¡ ¯°Et'2;t+1 + (1 + ¯°)'2t ¡ '2t¡1 = 0; (1.24)
where ¼
qd
t is again deﬁned in (1.11). Conditions (1.17) – (1.18) remain as before.19
Again using the latter two equations to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers, we obtain a
relation of the form
Et[A(L)(it+1 ¡ i
¤)] = ¡Et[(1 ¡ ¯°L
¡1)qt] (1.25)
for the optimal evolution of the target variables. Here A(L) is a cubic lag polynomial


















The lag polynomial A(L) can be factored as A(L) = (1 ¡ ¸1L)L2B(L¡1); where B(L¡1)
is a quadratic polynomial, and under our sign assumptions one can further show 20 that
0 < ¸1 < 1; while both roots of B(L) are outside the unit circle. Relation (1.25) is then
equivalent21 to a relation of the form





which generalizes (1.21) to the case ° 6= 0:
This provides us with a robustly optimal target criterion that can be expressed in the
form
Ft(¼) + ÁFt(x) = µ¼¼t¡1 + µxxt¡1 ¡ µi(it¡1 ¡ i
¤) ¡ µ∆∆it¡1; (1.28)
19One easily sees that in the case that ° = 1; the only long-run average inﬂation rate consistent with these
conditions is ¯ ¼ = i¤ ¡ ¯ r; where ¯ r is the unconditional mean of the natural rate of interest. This is true for
any ¸i > 0; no matter how small. Hence even a slight preference for lower interest-rate variability suﬃces
breaks the indeterminacy of the optimal long-run inﬂation target obtained for the case ° = 1 in section 1.2.
20See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), Proposition 8.
21See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), Proposition 11.
23generalizing (1.22). Under our sign assumptions, one can show22 that
Á = µx > 0;
0 < µ¼ · 1;
and
µi; µ∆ > 0:
Furthermore, for ﬁxed values of the other parameters, as ° ! 0; µ¼ approaches zero and the
other parameters approach the non-zero values associated with the target criterion (1.22).
Instead, as ° ! 1; µ¼ approaches 1, so that the target criterion involves only the projected
change in the rate of inﬂation relative to its already existing level, just as we found in section
1.2 when there was assumed to be no interest-rate stabilization objective.
The eﬀects of increasing ° on the coeﬃcients of the optimal target criterion (1.28) is
illustrated in Figure 4, where the coeﬃcients are plotted against °, assuming the same
calibrated values for the other parameters as before. It is interesting to note that each of
the coeﬃcients indicating history-dependence (µ¼;µx;µi; and µ∆) increases with ° (except
perhaps when ° is near one). Thus if there is substantial inﬂation inertia, it is even more
important for the inﬂation-forecast target to vary with changes in recent economic conditions.
It is also worth noting that the degree to which the inﬂation target should be modiﬁed in
response to changes in the output-gap projection (indicated by the coeﬃcient Á) increases
with °: While our conclusion for the case ° = 0 above (Á = :04) might have suggested
that this sort of modiﬁcation of the inﬂation target is not too important, we ﬁnd that a
substantially larger response is justiﬁed if ° is large. The optimal coeﬃcient is Á = 0.13, as
in sections 1.1 and 1.2, if ° = 1; and once again this corresponds to a weight of 0.51 if the
inﬂation target is expressed as an annualized rate.
The panels of Figure 5 correspondingly show the relative weights ®z;j=®z;0 on the forecasts
at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal target criterion (1.28), for each of several alternative
values of °: As above, the inclusion of an interest-rate stabilization objective makes the
22See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), Proposition 10.





































Figure 4: Coeﬃcients of the optimal targeting rule (1.28) as functions of °.
optimal target criterion more forward-looking than was the case in section 1.2. Indeed, we
now ﬁnd, at least for high enough values of °; that the optimal target criterion places non-
negligible weight on forecasts more than a year in the future. But it is not necessarily true
that a greater degree of inﬂation inertia justiﬁes a target criterion with a longer forecast
horizon. Increases in ° increase the optimal weights on the current-quarter projections of
both inﬂation and the output gap (normalizing the weights to sum to one), and instead
make the weights on the projections for quarters more than two quarters in the future less
positive. At least for low values of ° (in which case the weights are all non-negative), this
makes the optimal target criterion less forward-looking.
For higher values of °; increases in ° do increase the absolute value of the weights on
forecasts for dates one to two years in the future (these become more negative). But even
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Figure 5: Relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal criterion (1.28).
in this case, the existence of inﬂation inertia does not justify the kind of response to longer-
horizon forecasts that is typical of inﬂation-targeting central banks. An increase in the
forecast level of inﬂation and/or the output gap during the second year of a bank’s current
projection should justify a loosening of current policy, in the sense of a policy intended to
raise projected inﬂation and/or the output gap in the next few quarters. This is because
in the model with large °; welfare losses result from inﬂation variation rather than high
inﬂation as such; a forecast of higher inﬂation a year from now is then a reason to accept
somewhat higher inﬂation in the nearer term than one otherwise would.
1.4 Wages and Prices Both Sticky
A number of studies have found that the joint dynamics of real and nominal variables are
best explained by a model in which wages as well as prices are sticky (e.g., Amato and
Laubach, 2001b; Christiano et al., 2001; Smets and Wouters, 2002; Altig et al., 2002; and
26Woodford, 2003, chap. 3). This is often modeled in the way suggested by Erceg et al. (2000),
with monopolistic competition among the suppliers of diﬀerent types of labor, and staggered
wage setting analogous to the Calvo (1983) model of price setting. The structural equations
of the supply side of this model can be written in the form
¼t = ·p(xt + ut) + »p(wt ¡ w
n
t ) + ¯Et¼t+1; (1.29)
¼
w
t = ·w(xt + ut) + »w(w
n
t ¡ wt) + ¯Et¼
w
t+1; (1.30)
together with the identity
wt = wt¡1 + ¼
w
t ¡ ¼t; (1.31)
generalizing the single equation (1.1) for the ﬂexible-wage model. Here ¼w
t represents nominal
wage inﬂation, wt is the log real wage, wn
t represents exogenous variation in the “natural
real wage”, and the coeﬃcients »p;»w;·p;·w are all positive. The coeﬃcient »p indicates
the sensitivity of goods-price inﬂation to changes in the average gap between marginal cost
and current prices; it is smaller the stickier are prices. Similarly, »w indicates the sensitivity
of wage inﬂation to changes in the average gap between households’ “supply wage” (the
marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and consumption) and current wages,
and measures the degree to which wages are sticky.23
We note furthermore that ·p ´ »p!p and ·w ´ »w(!w +¾¡1); where !p > 0 measures the
elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the quantity supplied, at a given wage; !w > 0
measures the elasticity of the supply wage with respect to quantity produced, holding ﬁxed
households’ marginal utility of income; and ¾ > 0 is the same intertemporal elasticity of
substitution as in (1.15). In the limit of perfectly ﬂexible wages, »w is unboundedly large,
and (1.30) reduces to the contemporaneous relation wt ¡ wn
t = (!w + ¾¡1)(xt + ut): Using
this to substitute for wt in (1.29), the latter relation then reduces to (1.1), where
· ´ »p(!p + !w + ¾
¡1) (1.32)
23For further discussion of these coeﬃcients, and explicit formulas for them in terms of the frequency of
wage and price adjustment, see section 2 below.
27and the cost-push shock ut has been rescaled.
Given the proposed microeconomic foundations for these relations, Erceg et al. show
that the appropriate welfare-theoretic stabilization objective is a discounted criterion of the





t + ¸x(xt ¡ x
¤)
2: (1.33)



























as functions of the underlying model parameters. Note that we have normalized the weights
so that ¸p+¸w = 1; and that (1.35) generalizes the previous expression (1.4) for the ﬂexible-
wage case.
Here we again abstract from the motives for interest-rate stabilization discussed in the
previous section. As a result, we need not specify the demand side of the model. We then
wish to consider policies that minimize the criterion deﬁned by (1.2) and (1.33), subject to
the constraints (1.29) – (1.31).
The Lagrangian method illustrated above now yields a system of ﬁrst-order conditions
¸p¼t + 'pt ¡ 'p;t¡1 + Àt = 0; (1.36)
¸w¼
w
t + 'wt ¡ 'w;t¡1 ¡ Àt = 0; (1.37)
¸x(xt ¡ x
¤) ¡ ·p'pt ¡ ·w'wt = 0; (1.38)
Àt = »p'pt ¡ »w'wt + ¯EtÀt+1; (1.39)
where 'pt;'wt;Àt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (1.29), (1.30) and
(1.31) respectively. We can again use three of the equations to eliminate the three Lagrange
multipliers, obtaining a target criterion of the form
(·w ¡ ·p)¼
asym




t ´ ¸p»p¼t ¡ ¸w»w¼
w
t







is a (weighted) average of the rates of price and wage inﬂation, and










In the special case that ·w = ·p = · > 0, which empirical studies such as that of Amato
and Laubach (2001b) ﬁnd to be not far from the truth,24 the optimal target criterion (1.40)
reduces simply to qt = 0; or
¼
sym
t + Á(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0; (1.42)
with Á = ¸x=· as in section 1.1.25 More generally, the optimal target criterion is more com-
plex, and slightly more forward-looking (as a result of the inertia in the real-wage dynamics
when both wages and prices are sticky26). But it still takes the form of an output-adjusted
inﬂation target, involving the projected paths of both price and wage inﬂation; and since all
terms except the ﬁrst one in (1.40) are equal to zero under a commitment to ensure that
qt = 0 at all times, the target criterion (1.42) continues to provide a fairly good approxima-
tion to optimal policy even when ·w is not exactly equal to ·p:
This is of the same form as the optimal target criterion (1.8) for the case in which only
prices are sticky, with the exception that the index of goods price inﬂation ¼t is now replaced
by an index ¼
sym
t that takes account of both price and wage inﬂation. Of course, the weight
24See the discussion in Woodford (2003), chapter 3. In this case, the structural equations (1.29) – (1.30)
imply that the real wage will be unaﬀected by monetary policy, instead evolving as a function of the real
disturbances alone. Empirical studies often ﬁnd that the estimated response of the real wage to an identiﬁed
monetary policy shock is quite weak, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Indeed, it is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in our own analysis in section 2, though the point estimates for the impulse response
function suggest that wages are not as sticky as prices.
25Here we assume a normalization of the loss function weights in (1.33) in which ¸p+¸w = 1; corresponding
to the normalization in (1.3).
26This only aﬀects the optimal target criterion, of course, to the extent that the evolution of the real wage
is endogenous, which requires that ·w 6= ·p:
29that should be placed on wages in the inﬂation target depends on the relative weight on wage
stabilization in the loss function (1.33). If one assumes a “traditional” stabilization objective
of the form (1.3), so that ¸w = 0; then (1.42) is again identical to (1.8). However, one can
show that expected utility maximization corresponds to minimization of a discounted loss
criterion in which the relative weight on wage-inﬂation stabilization depends on the relative
stickiness of wages and prices, as discussed by Erceg et al. (2000).27
1.5 Habit Persistence
In the simple models thus far, the intertemporal IS relation (1.15) implies that aggregate
demand is determined as a purely forward-looking function of the expected path of real inter-
est rates and exogenous disturbances. Many empirical models of the monetary transmission
mechanism instead imply that the current level of aggregate real expenditure should depend
positively on the recent past level of expenditure, so that aggregate demand should change
only gradually even in the case of an abrupt change in the path of interest rates. A simple
way of introducing this is to assume that private expenditure exhibits “habit persistence” of
the sort assumed in the case of consumption expenditure by authors such as Fuhrer (2000),
Edge (2000), Christiano et al. (2001), Smets and Wouters (2002), and Altig et al. (2002).
Here, as in the models above, we model all interest-sensitive private expenditure as if it
were non-durable consumption; that is, we abstract from the eﬀects of variations in private
expenditure on the evolution of productive capacity.28 Hence we assume habit persistence in
the level of aggregate private expenditure, and not solely in consumption, as in the models of
Amato and Laubach (2001a) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003). This might seem odd, given
that we do not really interpret the “Ct” in our model as referring mainly to consumption
expenditure. But quantitative models that treat consumption and investment spending
separately often ﬁnd that the dynamics of investment spending are also best captured by
27See also Woodford (2003, chap. 6), which modiﬁes the derivation of Erceg et al. to take account of the
discounting of utility.
28See McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for further discussion of this simpliﬁ-
cation.
30speciﬁcations of adjustment costs that imply inertia in the rate of investment spending (e.g.,
Edge, 2000; Christiano et al., 2001; Altig et al., 2002; Basu and Kimball, 2002). The
“habit persistence” assumed here should be understood as a proxy for adjustment costs in
investment expenditure of that sort, and not solely (or even primarily) as a description of
household preferences with regard to personal consumption.29
Following Boivin and Giannoni (2003), let us suppose that the utility ﬂow of any house-
hold h in period t depends not only on its real expenditure Ch
t in that period, but also on
that household’s level of expenditure in the previous period.30 Speciﬁcally, we assume that










where »t is a vector of exogenous taste shocks, u(¢;») is an increasing, concave function for
each value of the exogenous disturbances, and 0 · ´ · 1 measures the degree of habit
persistence. (Our previous model corresponds to the limiting case ´ = 0 of this one.) The
household’s budget constraint remains as before.
In this extension of our model, the marginal utility for the representative household of
additional real income in period t is no longer equal to the marginal utility of consumption
in that period, but rather to
¸t = uc(Ct ¡ ´Ct¡1;»t) ¡ ¯´Et[uc(Ct+1 ¡ ´Ct;»t+1)]: (1.43)
The marginal utility of income in diﬀerent periods continues to be linked to the expected
return on ﬁnancial assets in the usual way, so that equilibrium requires that
¸t = ¯Et[¸t+1(1 + it)Pt=Pt+1]: (1.44)
Using (1.43) to substitute for the ¸’s in (1.44), we obtain a generalization of the usual Euler
equation for the intertemporal allocation of aggregate expenditure given expected rates of
return.
29For further discussion, see Woodford (2003, chapter 5, sec. 1.2).
30Note that the consumption “habit” is assumed here to depend on the household’s own past level of
expenditure, and not on that of other households.
31Log-linearization of this Euler equation yields a generalization of our previous IS relation
(1.15), of the form
˜ xt = Et˜ xt+1 ¡ '




˜ xt ´ (xt ¡ ´xt¡1) ¡ ¯´Et(xt+1 ¡ ´xt);
'
¡1 ´ (1 ¡ ¯´)¾ > 0;
and ¾ ´ ¡uc=(¯ Y ucc) as before. Here xt is again the log gap between actual output and the
ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of markup ﬂuctuations, and rn
t is
again the ﬂexible-price equilibrium real interest rate in the absence of markup ﬂuctuations,
i.e., the real interest rate associated with an equilibrium in which xt = 0 at all times. Note
that when ´ = 0; ' reduces to ¾¡1; ˜ xt reduces to xt, and (1.45) reduces to (2.7). In the
general case, the log marginal utility of real income is negatively related to ˜ xt, rather than
to xt, which is why ˜ xt appears in the generalized IS relation (1.45).
This modiﬁcation of preferences changes the form of the aggregate-supply relation (1.1)
as well. (For simplicity, we here consider only the case of a model with ﬂexible wages and
Calvo pricing.) In the derivation of (1.1), we have assumed that the log marginal utility of
real income (which aﬀects real supply costs owing to its eﬀect on real wage demands) can be
replaced by a linear function of xt; but just as in the case of the IS relation, this now must
be written as a linear function of ˜ xt instead. We then obtain an aggregate-supply relation
of the form
¼t = »p[!xt + '˜ xt] + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; (1.46)
where »p > 0 is the same coeﬃcient as in (1.29), and ! ´ !p + !w > 0: The relation can
equivalently be rewritten in the form
¼t = ·[(xt ¡ ±xt¡1) ¡ ¯±Et(xt+1 ¡ ±xt)] + ¯Et¼t+1 + ut; (1.47)
where 0 · ± · ´ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation
´'(1 + ¯±
2) = [! + '(1 + ¯´
2)]±; (1.48)
32and31
· ´ »p´'=± > 0: (1.49)
Again taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of the expected utility of the rep-
resentative household,32 we again obtain a discounted criterion of the form (1.2), but now
with a period loss function of the form
Lt = ¼
2
t + ¸(xt ¡ ±xt¡1 ¡ ˆ x
¤)
2; (1.50)
generalizing (1.3). Here ¸ is again deﬁned as in (1.4), the parameters ·;± are the same as
in the aggregate-supply relation (1.47), and the size of ˆ x¤ > 0 depends once more on both
the degree of market power and the size of tax distortions. As in the analysis of Amato and
Laubach (2001a), habit persistence implies that the period loss function should depend on
the lagged output gap as well as the present gap. However, we note that both the inﬂationary
pressures indicated in (1.47) and the deadweight losses measured by (1.50) depend on the
quasi-diﬀerenced output gap xt ¡ ±xt¡1; where ± is the smaller root of (1.48). And while ±
is an increasing function of ´; it may be much smaller than it; if ! is large relative to ';
then ± may be quite small even in the presence of substantial habit persistence. This is the
case that our estimates below suggest is empirically realistic: while the best empirical ﬁt is
obtained for the extreme value ´ = 1; the implied value of ± is only 0.14.
An optimal target criterion is easily derived, even in the presence of habit persistence, in
the case that there are no transactions frictions, nor any other grounds for an interest-rate
stabilization objective. In this case an optimal policy seeks to minimize the discounted sum
of losses (1.50) subject to the sequence of constraints (1.47). The same Lagrangian method
as above yields ﬁrst-order conditions
¼t + 't ¡ 't¡1 = 0; (1.51)
¸(xt ¡ ±xt¡1 ¡ ˆ x
¤) ¡ ·'t + ±·'t¡1 = 0; (1.52)
31In the limiting case in which ´ = 0; ± = 0; while ±=´ approaches the well-deﬁned limit '=(! + '); so
that · = »p(!+') = »p(!+¾¡1): Thus in this limit, (1.47) reduces to (1.1), where · is deﬁned as in (1.32).
32For details of the calculation, see the derivation in the appendix for the full model, incorporating habit
persistence, that is introduced in section 2.
33generalizing (1.6) – (1.7). An optimal target criterion is again obtained by eliminating the
Lagrange multiplier. In the case that ± < 1; as is necessarily true (even in the extreme
case where ´ = 1) given ! > 0; (1.52) implies that a time-invariant way of identifying the
Lagrange multiplier is
't = (¸=·)(xt ¡ x
¤);




(xt ¡ xt¡1) = 0: (1.53)
Thus the optimal target criterion is exactly the same as in our baseline model, and
is unaﬀected by the estimated value of ´: The estimated degree of habit persistence does
matter for the central bank’s judgment about which inﬂation/output paths are feasible, and
also about the interest-rate path that will be necessary in order to achieve them. But it
has no consequences for the target criterion that should be used to judge whether a given
inﬂation/output projection is acceptable.
The degree of habit persistence does matter for the optimal target criterion in the case of




t + ¸x(xt ¡ ±xt¡1 ¡ ˆ x
¤)
2 + ¸i(it ¡ i
¤)
2; (1.54)
where ¸i > 0 for any of the reasons discussed in section 1.3. In this case the relevant
constraints on possible equilibrium paths of the target variables include both (1.45) and
(1.47) each period. In the resulting system of ﬁrst-order conditions, (1.16) and (1.18) are









B(L) ´ (1 ¡ ¯
¡1L)(1 ¡ ´L)(L ¡ ¯´):
34Using two of these relations to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers from the other, we obtain
a target criterion of the form








generalizing (1.19), where the deﬁnitions of Á¼ and Áx are as in (1.20), but with ' replacing
¾¡1 in the previous expressions. Here we see that the presence of habit persistence introduces
additional dynamics into the form of the optimal target criterion. Nonetheless, it is inter-
esting to note that once again, the optimal target criterion involves only the rate of change
of the output gap, rather than its absolute level, even when the utility-based stabilization
objective instead indicates a concern to stabilize the value of xt ¡ ±xt¡1:
2 A Small Quantitative Model of the U.S. Economy
We now turn to the question of the likely quantitative importance of the various considera-
tions discussed in section 1 in the actual conduct of monetary policy. In order to do this, we
ﬁrst estimate the numerical parameters of a model that, while still very stylized, is intended
to capture important features of the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S. economy.
We present an updated version of the analysis in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), incor-
porating a number of additional complications — habit persistence, wage stickiness, and
inﬂation inertia — that have been argued in the subsequent empirical literature to aﬀord
important improvements in the realism of this sort of optimizing model of the transmission
mechanism, as discussed in section 1. The model that we use is similar the one estimated
by Boivin and Giannoni (2003), extended to allow for sticky wages.
Our approach to estimation of the model parameters follows the lines proposed in Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997) and also used in Boivin and Giannoni (2003). First, we estimate
an unconstrained vector autoregression model of a small number of U.S. aggregate time
series. This VAR is used (along with weak identifying assumptions) both to identify the
coeﬃcients of the Fed’s reaction function in the historical period, and to estimate the im-
35pulse responses of our variables to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock under that historical
policy. In a second step, we develop a simple optimizing model that can replicate the eﬀects
of identiﬁed monetary policy shocks, as implied by the VAR. We estimate the structural
parameters of the model by minimizing the weighted distance between the estimated VAR
impulse responses to a monetary policy shock and the model’s predicted responses to the
same shock. We are then able to recover the historical sequence of structural disturbances
and to estimate a law of motion for them, which we use for certain exercises in section 3.
However, for purposes of the sort of characterization of optimal policy oﬀered here (as op-
posed to those proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997, 1999), our conclusions about
the character of the historical disturbance processes are much less important than our con-
clusions about the coeﬃcients of the structural relations that relate the endogenous variables
to one another.
In a third step, discussed in section 3, we derive a welfare-theoretic loss function for the
evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules, by computing a second-order approximation
to the expected utility of the representative household in our model. We then proceed along
the lines of Giannoni and Woodford (2002a, 2002b) to derive a robustly optimal inﬂation-
targeting rule for monetary policy.
2.1 The Eﬀects of Monetary Disturbances
Here we brieﬂy present the VAR that we use to estimate the actual monetary policy rule as
well as the eﬀects of monetary policy disturbances. We assume that the recent U.S. monetary
policy can be described by the following feedback rule for the Federal funds rate
it = ¯ { +
ni X
k=1
Áik (it¡k ¡¯ {) +
nw X
k=0
Áwk ˆ wt¡k +
n¼ X
k=0
Á¼k (¼t¡k ¡ ¯ ¼) +
ny X
k=0
Áyk ˆ Yt¡k + "t (2.1)
where it is the Federal funds rate in period t; ¼t denotes the rate of inﬂation between periods
t¡1 and t; ˆ wt is the deviation of the log real wage from trend at date t, ˆ Yt is the deviation of
log real GDP from trend, and ¯ {; ¯ ¼ are long-run average values of the respective variables.33
The disturbances "t represent monetary policy “shocks” and are assumed to be serially
36uncorrelated. Estimated policy rules often omit real wages, but we include them in (2.1)
for generality; the VAR that we use below to estimate impulse responses is then completely
unrestricted (except as to number of lags).
To identify the monetary policy shocks and estimate the coeﬃcients in (2.1), we assume
as in the studies of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Bernanke
and Mihov (1998), and Christiano et al. (2001), among others, that a monetary policy shock
at date t has no eﬀect on inﬂation, output or the real wage in that period. It follows that (2.1)
can be estimated by OLS, and that the residuals of the estimated equation will represent a
historical sequence of monetary policy shocks.
We model the dynamics of the vector Zt =
h
it; ˆ wt+1;¼t+1; ˆ Yt+1
i0
by a structural VAR of
with three lags. This can then be written in companion form as
T ¯ Zt = a + A ¯ Zt¡1 + ¯ et (2.2)







and T is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the diagonal
and nonzero oﬀ-diagonal elements only in the ﬁrst four rows, the ﬁrst four rows of the vector
a contain constants, and A contains estimated coeﬃcients from the VAR in the ﬁrst four
rows, and an identity matrix in the lower rows. The ﬁrst row of the estimated system (2.2)
corresponds to the estimated monetary policy rule (2.1).
To estimate the VAR, we consider quarterly U.S. data on the sample period 1980:1 –
2002:2. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), and Amato and Laubach (2001b), we begin
the sample in the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 because several empirical studies have identiﬁed
a signiﬁcant change in monetary policy around that period (see, e.g., Clarida, Gal´ ı and
Gertler, 2000; Boivin, 2001; Boivin and Giannoni, 2003; Cogley and Sargent, 2001, 2002).34
33Speciﬁcally, ˆ Yt is the log of real GDP minus a linear trend. Inﬂation is computed as the quarterly growth
of the GDP deﬂator (chain-type), annualized. The interest rate it is the quarterly average of the Federal funds
rate, annualized. The real wage is the log of wages and salaries in the compensation of employees published
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, divided by the GDP deﬂator; a linear trend is then substracted from
the log real wage to obtain ˆ wt.
34Some studies suggest that monetary policy has changed again around the mid-1980’s. However, Boivin
and Giannoni (2003), following the approach proposed by Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2002), show that
impulse response functions to monetary policy disturbances in a factor-augmented VAR are similar to the
ones reported here, when estimated both on the 1980-2002 and 1984-2002 sample periods.
37Ái1 Ái2 Ái3 Áw0 Áw1 Áw2
0.572 -0.085 0.192 0.365 -0.008 -0.406
(0.104) (0.127) (0.090) (0.202) (0.302) (0.191)
Á¼0 Á¼1 Á¼2 Áy0 Áy1 Áy2
0.071 0.146 0.472 0.333 -0.038 -0.118
(0.098) (0.115) (0.115) (0.176) (0.241) (0.169)
R2 DW
0.956 2.033
Standard errors are in parenthesis
Table 2: Estimated Monetary Policy Rule (1980:1 - 2002:2)
Table 2 reports the coeﬃcients of the estimated policy rule. While these coeﬃcients
are diﬃcult to interpret as such, we note that the estimated rule implies that the interest
rate would eventually increase by 2.14 percentage points in the long run, in response to a
one percentage point permanent increase in inﬂation, and that it would increase by 0.55
percentage point in response to a one percent permanent increase in output. These are
similar long-run response coeﬃcients to those obtained by authors such as Taylor (1993,
1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), and Clarida et al. (2000). The estimated real-wage
response coeﬃcients at diﬀerent lags are close to cancelling; the estimated reaction function
is quite similar to one in which the central bank responds only to the rate of real-wage
growth, rather than to the level of real wages. The response to real wage growth is strongly
positive, indicating that increases in wages lead to a stronger and more immediate increase
in nominal interest rates than do increases in prices of the same magnitude. While wages
are not often included as an explanatory variable in estimated Fed reaction functions, our
results here suggest that wage growth is also an important explanatory variable.
Figure 6 shows the estimated impulse response functions of output, the real wage, inﬂa-
tion, and the interest rate. Here the dashed lines indicate 90% conﬁdence intervals, obtained
using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap procedure. Because of our identifying assumption, output,
inﬂation, and the real wage remain unchanged in the period of the shock. In the quarter
38following the shock, output still barely moves, while inﬂation and the real wage start de-
clining. Output falls substantially in the second quarter after the shock and then returns
progressively back to its initial level. In contrast, inﬂation and the real wage both reach
their lowest levels only ﬁve quarters after the shock.
2.2 A Quantitative Model of the Transmission Mechanism
We now describe a simple optimizing model that we use to explain the eﬀects of monetary
policy on output, inﬂation, the real wage, and interest rates. While the model is still very
stylized, it contains several ingredients that allow it to replicate important features of the
impulse response functions estimated using our VAR. We assume that there exists a con-
tinuum of households indexed by h and distributed uniformly on the [0;1] interval. Each























where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the household’s discount factor (assumed to be equal for each household);
Ch
t is a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) index of the household’s consumption of each of the diﬀerentiated
goods supplied at time t, Pt is the corresponding price index, and Hh
t is the amount of
labor (of type h) that household h supplies at date t: Here we assume that each household
specializes in the supply of one type of labor, and that each type of labor is supplied by
an equal number of households. The parameter 0 · ´ · 1 represents the degree of habit
formation, as in section 1.5. The stationary vector »t represents exogenous disturbances to
preferences. For each value of »; the function u(¢;») is assumed to be increasing and concave,
while v (¢;») is increasing and convex.
2.2.1 Optimal Consumption Decisions
While the optimal allocation consumption at date t is chosen at date t; and is determined by
the usual Dixit-Stiglitz demand relations, we assume as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
that households must choose their index of consumption Ch
t at date t ¡ 2: Equivalently, we
39assume that Ch
t is determined at the beginning of period t ¡ 1; i.e., before the monetary
policy shock in t ¡ 1 is known. We assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete so that
risks are eﬃciently shared. As a result, each household faces a single intertemporal budget
constraint.








= Et¡2 f¸tg (2.4)
for each date t ¸ 2 and each possible state at date t ¡ 2, generalizing (1.43), where again
¸t denotes the representative household’s marginal utility of real income at date t:35 The
marginal utilities of income at diﬀerent dates and in diﬀerent states must furthermore satisfy
¸tQt;T=Pt = ¯
T¡t¸T=PT (2.5)
for any possible state at any date T ¸ t; where Qt;T is the stochastic discount factor that
deﬁnes the market valuations of alternative random income streams. Noting that the riskless
one-period nominal interest rate it must satisfy (1 + it)
¡1 = EtQt;t+1; we obtain once again
(1.44) as an equilibrium relation linking interest rates to the evolution of the marginal utility
of income. We assume furthermore that the government purchases a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate
Gt, determined at date t ¡ 1, of all goods in the economy, so that aggregate demand Yt
satisﬁes Yt = Ct + Gt:
We make use of log-linear approximations of these relationships about a steady state
equilibrium in which there is no inﬂation. Log-linearization of (1.44) yields
ˆ ¸t = Et[ˆ ¸t+1 +ˆ {t ¡ ¼t+1]: (2.6)










; and ¼t ´ log(Pt=Pt¡1): Using this, and log-linearizing
(2.4) we obtain an equation of the form
˜ Yt = ˘ gt + Et¡2
³
˜ Yt+1 ¡ ˘ gt+1
´
¡ '
¡1Et¡2 (ˆ {t ¡ ¼t+1) ¡ ¯´
³
Etˆ Yt+1 ¡ Et¡2ˆ Yt+1
´
(2.7)
35Because the problem is the same for each household h (the initial level of wealth is assumed to diﬀer
for any two households in a way that compensates for any diﬀerence in their expected labor incomes,
and complete ﬁnancial markets allow complete pooling of idiosyncratic labor income risk thereafter), all
households choose identical state-contingent plans for consumption.
40where ' is deﬁned as in (1.45), ˘ gt represents exogenous demand shocks including preference
shocks and ﬂuctuations in government expenditure, and ˜ Yt ´
³




Etˆ Yt+1 ¡ ´ˆ Yt
´
;




: Equation (2.7) generalizes the intertemporal IS relation (1.45).
For our welfare analysis, it is convenient to rewrite this relation in terms of the output
gap
xt ´ ˆ Yt ¡ ˆ Y
n
t
where ˆ Y n
t indicates log deviations in the natural rate of output, by which we mean the
equilibrium level of output under ﬂexible prices, ﬂexible wages, constant levels of distorting
taxes and of desired markups in the labor and product markets, and with wages, prices and
spending decisions predetermined by only one period.36
Expressing (2.7) in terms of the output gap, we obtain
Et¡2˜ xt = Et¡2˜ xt+1 ¡ '
¡1Et¡2 (ˆ {t ¡ ¼t+1 ¡ ˆ r
n
t ) (2.8)
where ˜ xt ´ (xt ¡ ´xt¡1)¡¯´ (Etxt+1 ¡ ´xt) and ˆ rn
t is an exogenous variable that represents
the deviation from steady state of the natural rate of interest, i.e., the equilibrium real rate
of interest in the ideal situation deﬁned above. The actual output gap relates furthermore
to the expected output gap through
˜ xt = Et¡2˜ xt +
³


























36Up to the log-linear approximation used in our estimation of the model, ˆ Y n
t deﬁned in this way is just
the conditional expectation at date t ¡ 1 of the log deviation of the equilibrium level of output when none
of these variables are predetermined at all. Because wages and prices are both predetermined a period in
advance, it is only the component of the output gap that is forecastable a period in advance that matters in
any event for these equations. It is similarly only the variation in the forecastable component of the output
gap that need be considered when evaluating welfare under alternative policies, since the unforecastable
component of the output gap (deﬁned relative to a concept of the “natural rate” that is not predetermined)
would in any event be both exogenous and uncorrelated with the forecastable component. It then simpliﬁes
notation to deﬁne the output gap as the gap between actual output and the forecastable component of the
natural rate. In this way, xt becomes a predetermined state variable.
412.2.2 Optimal Wage and Price Setting
As in Erceg et al. (2000), Amato and Laubach (2001b), and Woodford (2003, chap. 3), we
assume that there is a single economy-wide labor market. The producers of all goods hire
the same kinds of labor and face the same wages. Firm z is a monopolistic supplier of good
z, which it produces according to the production function




´ Atf (Ht (z))
where f0 > 0; f00 < 0; the variable At > 0 is an exogenous technology factor, and capital is
assumed to be ﬁxed so that labor is the only variable input. The labor used to produce each












for some elasticity of substitution µw > 1; where Hh
t (z) is the labor of type h that is hired
to produce a given good z: The demand for labor of type h by ﬁrm z is again of the Dixit-
Stiglitz form Hh





; where wt (h) is the nominal wage of labor of type
h; and Wt is a wage index.
We assume that the wage for each type of labor is set by the supplier of that type, who
is in a situation of monopolistic competition and who is ready to supply as many hours of
work as may be demanded at that wage. We assume that each wage is reoptimized with a
ﬁxed probability 1 ¡ ®w each period. However, as in Woodford (2003, ch. 3), if a wage is
not reoptimized, it is adjusted according to the indexation rule
logwt (h) = logwt¡1 (h) + °w¼t¡1
for some 0 · °w · 1: A worker of type h who chooses a new wage wt (h) at date t; expects
to have a wage wt (h)(PT¡1=Pt¡1)
°w with probability ®T¡t
w at any date T ¸ t: We assume
furthermore that the newly chosen wage that comes into eﬀect in period t; w¤
t; is chosen at
the end of period t ¡ 1; i.e., on the basis of information available at date t ¡ 1:
42As shown in Woodford (2003, ch. 3), this setup yields as a ﬁrst-order approximation, a
wage inﬂation equation of the form
(¼
w










generalizing (1.30) to allow for indexation to the lagged price index, habit persistence, and
predetermined wage-setting and spending decisions. Here ¼w
t denotes nominal wage inﬂation,
wt is the log real wage, and wn
t is an exogenous variable representing the log of the “natural
real wage”, i.e., the equilibrium real wage when both wages and prices are fully ﬂexible and
consumption is not predetermined. The parameter
»w ´
(1 ¡ ®w)(1 ¡ ®w¯)
®w (1 + ºµw)
> 0 (2.12)
is a function of the degree of wage stickiness, the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor
supply at the steady-state, º ´
vhh ¯ H
vh ; and the elasticity of substitution for diﬀerent types of
labor. The parameter !w ´ ºÁ > 0 indicates the degree to which higher economic activity




> 0 is the
elasticity of the required labor input with respect to output variations.)
Integrating (2.11) forward, we note that nominal wages at date t tend to increase (above
lag inﬂation) when expected future positive output gaps are positive and when real wages
are expected to be below their natural rate. The variable ¹t ´ ˆ ¸t ¡ 'Et
³
˜ gt ¡ ˜ Yt
´
; which
corresponds to the discrepancy between the (log) marginal utility of real income and the
(log) marginal utility of consumption satisﬁes
Et¡1¹t = Et¡1 (ˆ {t ¡ ¼t+1) + 'Et¡1
h
(˜ gt+1 ¡ ˜ gt) ¡
³
˜ Yt+1 ¡ ˜ Yt
´i
: (2.13)
The presence of Et¡1¹t in (2.11) indicates a moderating eﬀect on nominal wage inﬂation of
an expectation at date t ¡ 1 of real rates of return between t and t + 1 that are higher then
those that were anticipated at t¡2; i.e., at the time that consumption decisions were made
for period t: In fact, unexpectedly high real rates of return increase the value of income in
period t and thus lower average wage demands.
43Similarly, we assume that the suppliers of goods are in monopolistic competition and
that each price is reoptimized with a ﬁxed probability 1 ¡ ®p each period. However, as in
Woodford (2003, ch. 3), if a price is not reoptimized, it is again adjusted according to the
indexation rule
logpt (z) = logpt¡1 (z) + °p¼t¡1
for some 0 · °p · 1: Again following the development in Woodford (2003, ch. 3), we can
show that optimal pricing decisions result in an aggregate supply relation of the form
¼t ¡ °p¼t¡1 = »p!pEt¡1xt + »pEt¡1 (wt ¡ w
n





generalizing (1.29) to allow for indexation to the lagged price index and predetermination of
pricing decisions. Here
»p ´
(1 ¡ ®p)(1 ¡ ®p¯)
®p (1 + !pµp)
> 0 (2.15)
is a function of the degree of price stickiness, the elasticity of substitution for diﬀerent goods
µp > 1; and !p > 0 which measures the degree to which higher economic activity increases
producers’ prices for given wages. Integrating (2.14) forward, we observe that inﬂation tends
to increase (relative to past inﬂation) when agents expect positive future output gaps and/or
expect that real wages will be above their natural rate.
Finally, the evolution of the real wage is linked to wage inﬂation and price inﬂation
through the identity (1.31). Our structural model can then be summarized by a demand
block (2.8) – (2.9) and a supply block consisting of (2.11) – (2.14) together with (1.31). We
ﬁnally close the model with an equation such as (2.1) that characterizes the behavior of the
central bank. These equations then allow us to determine the equilibrium evolution of the
variables of interest: ¼t;¼w
t ;xt;ˆ {t; and wt:
2.3 Estimated Parameter Values
We turn now to the estimation of the parameters of the structural model just set out. As
mentioned above, we are looking for structural parameters that allow the model to describe
as well as possible the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Following Rotemberg and
44Woodford (1997), we choose the structural parameters that minimize the distance between
the estimated VAR impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock and the model’s
predicted response to the same shock. As discussed in Amato and Laubach (2001b), Boivin
and Giannoni (2003) and in Christiano et al. (2001), this is quite generally an estimation
procedure that allows for statistical inference on the model’s estimated structural parameters.
Note also that the model that we consider is constructed so as to be consistent with the
identifying assumptions made for the estimation of the VAR impulse response functions.
In particular, both the model and the VAR have the feature that output, inﬂation and
the real wage respond to unexpected changes in the interest rate with a lag of at least one
quarter. In addition, to the extent that we estimate the structural parameters on the basis of
impulse responses to monetary shocks, our estimation method has the advantage of providing
parameter estimates that are robust to potential misspeciﬁcations of the remaining shock
processes in the model. This is because in order to compute the impulse responses, we don’t
need to specify the stochastic process of the shocks such as ˜ gt; ˆ Y n
t ; ˆ !
n
t ; ˆ rn
t :
As in the studies mentioned above, we set ¯ = 0:99 so that ¯
¡1 corresponds approximately
to the steady-state real gross rate of interest which is about 1.01. In addition, we calibrate
the elasticity !p ´ ¡f00¯ Y =(f0)
2 to 0.33 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This would
be implied by a Cobb-Douglas production function in which the elasticity of output with
respect to hours is 0.75. Such a production function would yield a share of wages in the
value of output of 0.75/¹p where ¹p ´ µp=(µp ¡1) is the average gross markup of prices over
marginal cost due to market power in the goods markets. (This means a labor share of 0.74,
given the markup estimate reported below.)




by minimizing the distance
D(v) =
h










where ˆ fV is a vector that contains the VAR-based impulse response functions of output,
inﬂation, the real wage, and the interest rate to an unexpected monetary policy shock, and








































is vector containing the corresponding impulse response functions generated by the
model, for a given vector of structural parameters v and the vector of policy rule coeﬃcients
ˆ Á estimated in section 2.1. In fact to the extent that we estimated consistently the policy rule
of the form (2.1) when estimating the VAR, we do not need to estimate again its coeﬃcients
at this stage. The positive deﬁnite weighting matrix V that we use in our estimation is a
diagonal matrix, with the inverse of the variance of the estimate of each impulse response as
the corresponding diagonal element. This allows us to weight the various impulse responses
according to the degrees of precision with which each is estimated.37 We estimate the
structural parameters by matching model-based and VAR-based impulse responses of output,
37The use of the inverse of the complete variance-covariance matrix of impulse responses as a weighting
matrix would be more attractive, as this would yield eﬃcient estimates. But such a weighting matrix appears
to hinder the stability of the minimization algorithm. The matrix that we propose has the advantage of
reducing the weight on responses about which we are less sure, in addition to making our results independent
of the units in which we happen to measure the various series.
46Baseline No habit No indexation Flexible wages








































































' 0.7483 0.2318 0.3344 0.6643
´ 1 0 1 1
·p ´ »p!p 0.0007 0.0005 0.0024 0.0004
! ´ !p + !w 19.884 20.325 19.405 0.8975
º ´ !w=Á 14.663 14.994 14.304 0.4231
¹p ´
µp
µp¡1 1.0039 1.0027 1.0143 1.0029
¹w ´ µw
µw¡1 1.5361 1.5731 1.6113 —
Objective function value 13.110 15.886 16.580 18.837
Wald test (p-value) — 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Estimated structural parameters for the baseline case and restricted models.
inﬂation, the real wage, and the interest rate on quarters 0 to 12 following a unexpected
monetary policy shock. For consistency with the model, we constrain all parameters to be
positive and impose an upper bound at 1 on ´;°p and °w:
The estimated parameter values are shown in Table 3. Standard errors are in parentheses;
an asterisk next to the reported standard error indicates that the standard error may not
be reliable as the estimated parameter lies on the boundary of the allowed parameter space.
Here we report estimates (with standard errors) for parameters Ã ´
'¡1
1+¯´2 and ˜ ´ ´
´
1+¯´2
rather than for ' and ´; as the former nonlinear transformations of these parameters can
47be estimated with greater precision.38 The values of ' and ´ implied by these estimates
are shown in the second part of the table, along with the implied values for other model
parameters, making use of the calibrated parameter values reported in Table 4.
While some of the model parameters cannot be estimated at all precisely, as indicated
by the large standard errors, our estimation results are consistent with our theory insofar as
we estimate positive values for the response coeﬃcients ';»p;»w; and !w in our structural
equations. The values of Ã; measuring the interest-sensitivity of aggregate expenditure,39 and
»p; measuring the response of inﬂation to the real-wage gap, are both signiﬁcantly positive,
though the estimates of »w and !w are instead quite imprecise. We also ﬁnd small enough
standard errors on the standard errors of ˜ ´, measuring the degree of habit persistence, and °p;
measuring the degree of indexation of prices, to allow some inference about the magnitudes of
those parameters (for example, both are signiﬁcantly positive), while the value of °w is very
imprecisely estimated. In general, the parameters of our wage equation are poorly estimated,
while both our IS relation and our inﬂation equation are much better estimated.40
The second through fourth columns of Table 3 report the corresponding estimates, using
the same method, of various restricted versions of our model. In column 2, we assume zero
habit persistence, as in the models of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Amato and
Laubach (2001b); in column 3, no inﬂation inertia (i.e., no indexation of either wages or
prices to the lagged price index), also like the two models just mentioned; and in column 4,
ﬂexible wages, as in the models of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2003).41 In each case, the objective function value is reported for the restricted model, i.e.,
38Here Ã is estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive, implying a signiﬁcant eﬀect of interest rates on aggregate
demand, while the corresponding standard error for an estimate of ' would not allow us to judge that the
latter coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly positive. Similarly, ˜ ´ is estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive, implying
habit persistence, even though the corresponding standard error for the estimated value of ´ is much greater
than one.
39The parameter Ã is called by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) the “pseudo-elasticity of substitution”; it
measures the elasticity of expected output growth with respect to changes in the expected real rate of
return, holding constant output growth in other periods.
40A MATLAB program, available on our webpages, allows readers to check the extent to which our
numerical characterization of optimal policy would be diﬀerent in the case of alternative parameter values.
41The restricted model considered in column 4 corresponds to the model of Boivin and Giannoni, though
their method of estimation is diﬀerent, in that they do not ﬁt estimated impulse responses of the real wage
48the weighted distance D(º) deﬁned above. The p-values reported on the last line refer to
Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the restricted model is correct. In the last column,
the parameter °w is set to zero as it is not identiﬁed in the case of ﬂexible wages. We
see that each of these restrictions assumed in earlier studies can be individually rejected,
though the assumption of ﬂexible wages is the one that would reduce the model’s ability
to ﬁt the estimated impulse response functions to the greatest extent.42 Hence each of the
complications introduced here are found to be justiﬁed; in this respect, our ﬁndings agree
with those of Christiano et al. (2001), Altig et al. (2002), and Smets and Wouters (2002),
though these authors all also introduce additional complications in order to explain a larger
set of time series.
It is striking to note that the model ﬁts the impulse responses best when the degree of
inﬂation indexing (°p) and wage indexing to inﬂation (°w) reach their upper bound at 1.
This corresponds to the assumption of full wage and price indexing made by Christiano et
al. (2001). A value of °p = 1 is also roughly consistent with the weight on lagged inﬂation in
the “hybrid” aggregate-supply relation estimated by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), and results in
an aggregate supply relation quite similar to the one proposed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
The relatively small values of »p; and »w suggest that changes in the output gap and
the real wage gap have a relatively small impact on price and wage inﬂation. However the
estimated value of !w suggests that a one percent increase in economic activity increases
workers’ desired wages by nearly 20 percent, for given prices. The estimate of ' corresponds
to an elasticity of intertemporal substitution (adjusted by the degree of habit formation) of
'¡1 = 1:3: While authors such as Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano et al. (2001) among others
have estimated substantial degrees of habit formation, our estimate lies at the upper bound
of 1.
along with those of the other three variables, and their model assumes a diﬀerent form of monetary policy
rule. They also calibrate the value of ! = !w + !p; rather than only specifying a calibrated value for !p;
and they assume a value of ! much smaller than our estimate. Nonetheless, the estimates for the other
parameters reported in column 4 are similar to those obtained by Boivin and Giannoni, providing further
evidence regarding the robustness of our conclusions here.
42The implied impulse response functions are compared to the estimated ones in the case of each of the
restricted models in the technical appendix to this paper.
49¯ !p ®p ®w Á
0.99 1/3 2/3 2/3 4/3
Table 4: Additional calibrated parameter values.
While the estimated parameter values for ´, °p; and °w are signiﬁcantly smaller when
we estimate our model using impulse response functions over the six ﬁrst quarters or less
following the monetary shock, all parameter estimates are very similar to those reported
in Table 2, when we use impulse response functions that extend longer than six quarters.43
This suggests that in order to adequately capture the degree of persistence in the endogenous
variables, we need to perform our estimation using long enough responses.
Assuming, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) that ®p = 2=3,44 and similarly that
®w = 2=3; together with the other parameter values already mentioned above, it is possible
to infer the elasticities of substitution µp and µw from the estimated values of »p and »w
respectively, using the deﬁnitions (2.12) and (2.15). The values of these elasticities implied by
our estimates imply a gross markup of prices over marginal costs of only ¹p = µp=(µp ¡ 1) =
1:004 in the goods market, but a considerably higher gross markup of ¹w = µw=(µw ¡ 1) =
1:54 in the labor market. The fact that these implied markups are greater than one (i.e.,
that the implied elasticities of substitution are greater than one) again indicates consistency
of our estimates with our theoretical model.
Finally, our estimated value for !w can be used to derive an implied value of º; the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, using the deﬁnition !w = ºÁ and a calibrated
value for Á, the inverse of the elasticity of output with respect to the labor input. (The
calibrated value of Á reported in Table 4 is implied by the same Cobb-Douglas production
function as was used to calibrate the value of !p; discussed above.) The Frisch elasticity
of labor supply implied by our estimates is thus only on the order of 0.07, less than one
one-hundredth of the value implied by the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
and much more consistent with many estimates in the empirical literature on labor supply.
43Again, see the technical appendix for details.
44Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) base this calibration on Blinder’s (1994) survey evidence that prices
are maintained constant for an average of 9 months, so that 1=(1 ¡ ®p) equals 3 quarters.
50Because of the assumption of sticky wages, our model is able to account for non-negligible
eﬀects of a monetary disturbance on real activity without assuming that voluntary labor
supply (under ﬂexible wages) would be highly elastic. (Note that under the restriction of
ﬂexible wages, we would obtain estimates implying an elasticity of labor supply greater than
2.) While the values of these implied parameters do not matter for the ability of our model
to ﬁt the estimated impulse responses, they do matter for our welfare analysis below.
The solid lines in Figure 6 indicate the impulse response functions generated by our
estimated model. Overall, it appears that the model is able to replicate quite well the
impulse responses estimated by the VAR (circled lines), and the impulse responses remain
consistently within the 90% conﬁdence intervals. The model replicates in particular the
estimated hump shaped output and real wage responses. While it does not capture the
oscillations in the inﬂation response implied by the VAR, we note that this response is
estimated quite imprecisely.
3 Optimal Policy for the Estimated Model
Now that we have an estimated structural model which allows us to account for at least
certain aspects of the responses of output and of price and wage inﬂation to monetary
disturbances, we turn to the characterization of optimal policy in the context of this model.
3.1 A Welfare-Theoretic Stabilization Objective
An advantage of having developed a structural model based on optimizing behavior is that it
provides a natural objective for the monetary policy, namely maximization of the expected
utility of the representative household. Following the method of Woodford (2003, chap. 6),
we can express a second-order Taylor series approximation to this objective as a quadratic
function of (wage and price) inﬂation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate. The way
in which various aspects of our model speciﬁcation aﬀect the appropriate welfare-theoretic
stabilization objective in simple cases has already been discussed in section 1.
In the technical appendix to this paper, we show that for the model developed in section 2,
51¸p ¸w 16¸x ±
0.9960 0.0040 0.0026 0.035
Table 5: Loss-function coeﬃcients implied by our parameter estimates.
the corresponding welfare-theoretic loss function, abstracting from any grounds for concern



















In this expression, the weights ¸p;¸w > 0 are again deﬁned as in (1.34); the weight ¸x > 0 is
again deﬁned as in (1.35), but using now the deﬁnition (1.49) for · in the latter expression;
the coeﬃcient 0 · ± · ´ is again the smaller root of (1.48); and ˆ x¤ > 0 is the same function
of the microeconomic distortions aﬀecting the eﬃciency of the steady-state output level as
in (1.50).
This result combines features of several simpler cases discussed in section 1. Deadweight
loss depends on squared deviations of both price and wage inﬂation (separately) from the
rates that would minimize relative-price and relative-wage distortions, given that both wages
and prices are sticky, as in (1.33). Due to the indexation of both prices and wages to a
lagged price index, the loss-minimizing rates of wage and price inﬂation each period are
determined by the lagged inﬂation rate and the indexation coeﬃcients in each case, as in
(1.10). And ﬁnally, the presence of habit persistence implies that deadweight loss depends
not on squared deviations of the output gap from a constant value, but rather on squared
deviations of xt ¡ ±xt¡1 from a constant value, as in (1.50).
The numerical coeﬃcients of the welfare-theoretic loss function implied by the estimated
parameter values reported in Table 3 (for the baseline model) are reported in Table 5.
Interestingly, our estimated model implies that it is optimal for the central bank to put a
much larger weight on the stabilization of goods-price inﬂation than on the stabilization of
wage inﬂation or of the output gap. Moreover, despite the fact that we estimate a very high
degree of habit formation, which implies that household utility depends on the rate of change
of real expenditure rather than its level, the central bank’s loss function does not involve the
52variability of the change in the output gap. Instead, it involves the variability of the level of
the output gap relative to a small fraction of the lagged output gap.
These conclusions depend, of course, on our parameter estimates. It may seem surprising
that the weight on wage inﬂation stabilization is so small, given that our estimates do not
imply that wages are substantially more ﬂexible than prices (for example, »w is larger than
»p; but not by a large factor). The conclusion that ¸w is nonetheless very much smaller than
¸p reﬂects mainly the fact that our estimates imply a value for µp that is much larger than
Á
¡1µw: This in turn results from the fact that the estimated value of !w is much larger than
the calibrated value of !p:45 Because it is not plausible to assume a technology for which !p
could be nearly as large as the estimated value of !w; we are led to assume a value of µp
substantially larger than Á
¡1µw: The result that ¸p greatly exceeds ¸w then follows, using
(1.34).
The conclusion that ¸x is small follows, using (1.35), from the small value of ·p and large
value of µp implied by our parameter estimates. Since ·p ´ »p!p and the value of µp is
inferred from the value of »p using (2.15), both of these conclusions depend crucially on the
small estimated value for »p: Essentially, the observed insensitivity of inﬂation to variations
in output allows us to infer underlying microeconomic parameters that imply that variations
in the output gap cause relatively modest distortions — this is the only way, in the context
of our other assumptions, to explain the fact that inﬂation is not more strongly aﬀected (i.e.,
that the Phillips curve is not steeper).
Finally, the conclusion that ± is small (despite the fact that ´ = 1) follows, using (1.48),
from the fact that the value of ! implied by our estimates is large relative to the estimated
value of ': Essentially, the observed sensitivity of wages to variations in real activity on the
one hand (implying a large value for !w) and the sensitivity of aggregate expenditure to
interest-rate changes on the other (implying that ' cannot be too large) indicate preferences
45If »p and »w were assigned equal values, then under our assumption of equal values for ®p and ®w;
(2.12) and (2.15) would imply equal values for !pµp and !wÁ
¡1µw: (Here we recall that !w ´ ºÁ:) The
implied value of µp is then larger than Á
¡1!w by exactly the same factor as !w is larger than !p: In fact,
our estimated value for »p is smaller than our estimate for »w; and this further increases the relative size of
the implied value of µp:
53under which variations in the level of real activity will create greater distortions than varia-
tions in the rate of growth of real activity. Even when ´ = 1; the level of output matters to
the representative household because of its consequences for the amount that the household
must work; if the marginal disutility of output supply increases sharply with the level of
real activity (as implied by a large value of !), it will still be relatively more important to
stabilize the level of real activity than its rate of change.46
3.2 An Optimal Target Criterion
The method illustrated in section 1 for the derivation of optimal target criteria under al-
ternative assumptions can be applied as well in the case of the empirical model described
in section 2. Details of the relevant calculations are included in the technical appendix to
this paper; here we simply present the quantitative implications of our estimated parameter
values.
A ﬁrst observation about optimal policy in our estimated model follows from the fact
that wages, prices, and output are all predetermined for one quarter or longer in the model.
It follows that in our structural equations, any variations in the short-term nominal interest
rate it that are not forecastable a quarter earlier are irrelevant to the determination of wages,
prices, or output. Hence this component of interest-rate policy cannot be relevant for welfare
except through its consequences for the expected discounted value of the ¸i(it ¡ i¤)2 term
that must be added to (3.1) if we take account of monetary frictions. But this last term is
obviously minimized (in the case of any ¸i > 0) by a policy under which the nominal interest
rate is completely forecastable a quarter in advance. Even in the case that ¸i = 0; there
is no harm to any other stabilization objectives in eliminating unforecastable interest-rate
variations; and so it seems plausible to assumes at least some tiny concern with interest-rate
stabilization, so that it is optimal to suppress such variation in the interest rate.47
46As discussed in section 1.3 above, it may also be desirable to reduce the variability of nominal interest
rates; in this case, the loss function (3.1) should include an additional term, proportional to the squared
deviation of the nominal interest rate from an optimal value. We do not take up this possible extension of
the analysis here.
47For example, even if we assume that monetary frictions are of negligible quantitative signiﬁcance, we may
54Hence
it = Et¡1it (3.2)
is a requirement for optimal policy. This can be understood to say that all interest-rate
changes should be signaled by the central well in advance of the date at which they take
eﬀect. The instrument that the central bank must adjust in period t in order to ensure
that its period t target criterion will be projected to be satisﬁed is then not the period t
interest rate it; but rather the bank’s precommitted value Etit+1 for the level of short-term
nominal interest rates in the following period.48 We turn now to the property that the bank’s
projections regarding period t endogenous variables should be made to satisfy through an
appropriate commitment of this kind.
To simplify, we shall restrict attention to the case of a model in which °p = °w = 1; as
assumed by Christiano et al. (2001), and as indicated by our estimates in section 2. In the
appendix, we show that the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimal state-contingent evolution
of the endogenous variables can be manipulated, after the fashion illustrated in section 1,
to yield a characterization of optimal policy in terms of the projected paths of the target
variables alone. However, in the present case, unlike the simpler ones discussed in section
1, the most convenient representation of these conditions is not in terms of a single target
criterion, but two distinct ones. First of all, optimality requires that projections in any
period t satisfy a condition of the form49
Ft(¼) + Áw[Ft(w) ¡ wt] = ¯ ¼t: (3.3)
reasonably assume that the economy is a “cashless limiting economy” of the kind discussed in Woodford
(1998), rather than a genuinely cashless economy. In this case, there should in fact exist tiny monetary
frictions, that suﬃce to entail a preference for a completely forecastable nominal interest rate, in the absence
of any oﬀsetting beneﬁt from variations in response to current shocks.
48See further discussion in Svensson and Woodford (2003).
49The target criterion could equivalently be expressed in the form ÁpFt(¼)+ÁwFt(¼w) = ¯ ¼t; in which case
the target criterion would refer solely to projected inﬂation of diﬀerent sorts (both price and wage inﬂation).
This would be a representation analogous to the one given in section 1.4 above, and would make clear that
only the projected future paths of target variables (variables that enter the loss function) matter. We feel,
however, that the representation proposed here allows a more convenient numerical summary of the content
of the target criterion, by collecting the central bank’s projections regarding the future level of nominal
quantities in a single variable, the projected future price level.
55Here for each of the variables z = ¼;w; the expression Ft(z) refers to a weighted average of







where the weights ®z
k sum to one. Thus the coeﬃcient Áw is actually the sum of the weights
on real-wage forecasts at diﬀerent horizons k. We observe that the target criterion can be
thought of as a wage-adjusted inﬂation target. In addition to the correction for the projected
growth of real wages in the future, the acceptable rate of projected future inﬂation also varies
due to time variation in the target ¯ ¼t: Optimality further requires that ¯ ¼t be a function only
of information available at date t ¡ 1; and hence that
¯ ¼t = Et¡1[Ft(¼) + Áw(Ft(w) ¡ wt)]: (3.5)
In general, this optimal target will not be constant over time.
In addition to the above requirement (which amounts to the condition that the left-hand-
side of (3.3) be forecastable a quarter in advance), optimality also requires that projections
at date t satisfy another condition as well, of the form
F
¤








t (x) = ¼
¤
t; (3.6)
where the expressions F ¤
t (z) are again weighted averages of forecasts at diﬀerent horizons
(but with relative weights ®z¤
k that may be diﬀerent in this case), and ¼¤
t is another time-
varying target value, once again a predetermined variable. In this case the criterion speciﬁes
a target for a wage- and output-adjusted inﬂation projection.50
Optimality requires that the target value be given by an expression of the form
¼
¤
















where the expressions F 1
t (z) are still other weighted averages of forecasts at diﬀerent hori-
zons, with relative weights ®z1
k that again sum to one, and ¼¤ is an arbitrary constant.51
50As with (3.3), we could equivalently express this criterion in terms of a linear function of projections for
price inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and the output gap.
56Here, as with (3.5), the optimal target value depends on the previous quarter’s forecasts of
the economy’s subsequent evolution; this is a further example of the history-dependence of
optimal target criteria, already observed in simpler cases in section 1.
The optimal target criteria (3.3) – (3.5) and (3.6) – (3.7) generalize, for the estimated
model, the simple criterion (1.13) obtained in the case of inﬂation inertia, ° = 1; ﬂexible
wage, no habit persistence and no delays. To make this comparison more apparent, and to
get some intuition about the two optimal target criteria, it is useful to consider the special
case in which wages are ﬂexible. As we show in the technical appendix, the short-run optimal
target criterion (3.3) – (3.5) reduces in this case to
¼t+1 = Et¡1¼t+1
so that the central bank needs make inﬂation fully predictable two periods in advance under
optimal policy. The long-run optimal target criterion (3.6) – (3.7), reduces in turn to a
criterion of the form
Et [(¼t+2 ¡ ±¼t+1) + Á(xt+2 ¡ ±xt+1)] = (1 ¡ ±)¼
¤;
where ± is again the parameter that appears in the loss function and Á = µ
¡1
p ; i.e., the inverse
of the elasticity of demand faced by the typical ﬁrm.
As in section 1.2, a commitment to ensure that (3.6) – (3.7) holds in each period t ¸ t0
for a particular value of the constant ¼¤ is equivalent to a commitment to ensure that a ﬁrst
diﬀerenced form of (3.6) – (3.7) holds in each period.52 Such a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form would
have the advantage that it could be expressed entirely in terms of projections of the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the three variables — the inﬂation rate, the real wage, and the output gap
51Note that in the model considered here, as in section 1.2 when ° = 1, there is no welfare signiﬁcance to
any absolute inﬂation rate, only to changes in the rate of inﬂation, and to wage growth relative to prices.
There is therefore no particular inﬂation rate that could be justiﬁed as optimal from a timeless perspective.
For purposes of comparison between historical policy and the optimal criterion, discussed below, we assume
that steady-state inﬂation and the steady-state real wage are equal to the long-run values estimated (by the
VAR) under historical policy.
52We suppress the details of this alternative optimal targeting rule here. The ﬁrst-diﬀerenced formulation
is the one described in Woodford (2003, chapter 8).
57— with no dependence on the absolute levels of any of the variables. The target criterion
(3.6) – (3.7), instead, has the advantage of being simpler, as it only involves a comparison of
projections made in the current period with certain other projections in the previous period.
It may be wondered how we can specify optimal policy in terms of two distinct target
criteria involving diﬀerent linear combinations of projections, when the central bank has only
one instrument at its disposal. The key to this is to observe that the target criterion speciﬁed
by (3.3) – (3.5) restricts only the surprise components of the quarter t projections, i.e., the
way in which they may diﬀer from the projections that were made in quarter t ¡ 1 for the
same variables. Hence it is only the surprise component of the central bank’s interest-rate
decision — the diﬀerence between the Etit+1 announced in quarter t and Et¡1it+1 — that can
be determined by this criterion for optimal policy. The evolution of the (two-period-ahead)
predetermined component of policy, Et¡2it; can instead be chosen so as to ensure that the
second target criterion, speciﬁed by (3.6) – (3.7), is satisﬁed each period.
We may thus imagine the implementation of the optimal targeting rule to occur in the
following way.53 First, in each quarter t, the central bank intervenes in the money markets
(through open-market operations, repurchases, standing facilities in the interbank market
for central-bank balances, etc.) so as to implement the interest-rate target it announced
in quarter t ¡ 1. Second, as part of the quarter t decision cycle, the bank must choose an
operating target it+1 to announce for the following quarter. This is chosen in order to imply
a projected evolution of (wage and price) inﬂation from quarter t + 1 onward that satisﬁes
the target criterion (3.3), where ¯ ¼t is a target value that had been determined in quarter
t ¡ 1: Third, it is also necessary, as part of the quarter t decision cycle, for the central bank
to choose the target ¯ ¼t+1 for the following quarter. This is chosen so as to ensure that
future policy will be conducted in a way that allows the bank to project (conditional on its
current information) that the target criterion (3.6) – (3.7) should be satisﬁed. In practice,
53Because our empirical model is quarterly, it is simplest to discuss the policy process as if a policy decision
is also made once per quarter, even though in reality most central banks reconsider their operating targets
for overnight interest rates somewhat more frequently than this. Our discussion should not be taken to
imply that it is optimal for the policy committee to meet only once per quarter; this would follow from our
analysis only if (as in our model) all other markets were also open only once per quarter.
58this means that the central bank should use its model of the transmission mechanism to
determine the future evolution of the economy under the assumption that (3.6) – (3.7) will
hold in all future periods; this forecast then determines the target value ¯ ¼t+1 using (3.5).54
Algebraic expressions for each of the coeﬃcients in the optimal target criteria, as functions
of the underlying model parameters, are given in the appendix. Here we discuss only the
numerical coeﬃcients implied by our estimated parameter values. In the case of the short-
term criterion (3.3), the coeﬃcient Áw is equal to 0.565.55 Thus if unexpected developments
in quarter t are projected to imply a higher future level of real wages than had previously
been anticipated, policy must ensure that projected future price inﬂation is correspondingly
reduced. This is because of a desire to stabilize (nominal) wage inﬂation as well as price
inﬂation, and under circumstances of expected real wage growth, inﬂation must be curbed
in order for nominal wage growth to not be even higher.
The relative weights that this criterion places on projections at diﬀerent future horizons
are shown in Figure 7. The two panels plot the coeﬃcients ®¼
k;®w
k respectively, as functions
of the horizon k. Note that the quarter for which the projections receive greatest weight
is one quarter in the future, in each case. However, while the real-wage projection that
matters is primarily the projected growth in real wages between the present quarter and
the next one, substantial weight is also placed on projected inﬂation farther in the future;
in fact, the mean lead
P
k ®¼
kk is between 10 and 11 quarters in the future in the case of
the inﬂation projection Ft(¼): Thus the short-run target criterion is a (time-varying) target
for the average rate of inﬂation that is projected over the next several years, adjusted to
take account of expected wage growth, mainly over the coming quarter. Roughly speaking,
optimal policy requires the central bank to choose Etit+1 in quarter t so as to head oﬀ any
change in the projected average inﬂation rate over the next several years that is due to any
54See Svensson and Woodford (2003) for further discussion of the sort of calculations involved in a forecast-
targeting decision procedure.
55Here and below, we present the coeﬃcients for a target criterion where the inﬂation rate is measured in
annualized percentage points, rather than as a quarterly rate of change as in the model of section 2. When
the variables are deﬁned as in the model, the coeﬃcients multiplying the real-wage and output-gap terms
are only 1/4 as large as those given here and below.






















Figure 7: Relative weights on projections at diﬀerent horizons in the short-run target crite-
rion (3.3). The horizontal axis indicates the horizon k in quarters.
developments not anticipated in quarter t¡1 (and hence reﬂected in the current target ¯ ¼t¡1).
This is a criterion in the spirit of inﬂation-forecast targeting as currently practiced at central
banks such as the Bank of England, except that projected wage growth matters as well as
price inﬂation, and that the target shifts over time.
In the case of the long-term criterion (3.6), instead, the numerical coeﬃcients of the
target criterion are given by
Á
¤
w = 0:258; Á
¤
x = 0:135:
In this case, output-gap projections matter as well; a higher projected future output gap will
require a reduction in the projected future rate of inﬂation, just as will a higher projected
future real wage. The numerical size of the weight placed on the output-gap projection may









































































Figure 8: Relative weights on projections at diﬀerent horizons in the long-run target criterion.
Panels in the ﬁrst row indicate the projections in (3.6), while the second row indicates the
projections from the previous quarter that deﬁne the target value ¼¤
t.
projections in practice are likely to make this a quite signiﬁcant correction to the path of
the target criterion.
The relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in this criterion are plotted in
the panels in the ﬁrst row of Figure 8. We observe that in the case of this criterion, the
projections that mainly matter are those for two quarters in the future; the criterion is nearly
independent of projections regarding the quarter after the current one. Hence it makes sense
to think of this criterion as the one that should determine the policy that the central bank
plans on in periods two or more quarters in the future (and hence its choice in quarter t
of the target ¯ ¼t+1 to constrain its choice in the following period of Et+1it+2), but not as a
primary determinant of whether the bank’s intended policy in period t + 1 is on track.
Finally, the coeﬃcients of the rule (3.7) determining the target value for the long-term
61criterion are given by
µ
¤
¼ = 0:580; µ
¤
w = 0:252; µ
¤
x = 0:125:
The weights in the projections (conditional on information in the previous quarter) at various
horizons are plotted in the second row of Figure 8. Here too, it is primarily projections for
two quarters in the future that matter in each case. Roughly speaking, then, the target
value for the wage- and output-adjusted inﬂation projection two quarters in the future is
high when a similar adjusted inﬂation projection (again for a time two quarters in the future)
was high in the previous quarter.
Thus we ﬁnd that forecasting exercises, in which the central bank projects the evolution of
both inﬂation and real variables many years into the future under alternative hypothetical
policies on its own part, play a central role in a natural approach to the implementation
of optimal policy. A forecast of inﬂation several years into the future is required in each
(quarterly) decision cycle in order to check whether the intended interest-rate operating
target for the following quarter is consistent with the criterion (3.3). In addition, the time-
varying medium-term inﬂation target ¯ ¼t must be chosen each period on the basis of yet
another forecasting exercise. While the long-run target criterion (3.6) primarily involves
projections for a time only two quarters in the future, the choice of ¯ ¼t+1 requires that the
central bank solve for a projected path of the economy in which (3.6) is satisﬁed not only in
the current period, but in all future periods as well. Hence this exercise as well requires the
construction of projected paths for inﬂation and real variables extending many years into the
future. The relevant paths, however, will not be constant-interest-rate projections (of the
kind currently published by the Bank of England), but rather projections of the economy’s
future evolution given how policy is expected to evolve. Indeed, the projections are used to
select constraints upon the bank’s own actions in future decision cycles (by choosing both
the interest-rate operating target Etit+1 and the adjusted inﬂation target ¯ ¼t+1 in period t).













Figure 9: Actual and forecastable variation in the U.S. federal funds rate.
3.3 A Comparison with Actual U.S. Policy
An interesting question about this policy rule is the extent to which it would prescribe
policy diﬀerent from that which the Fed has actually pursued during our sample period.
A simple way of considering this is to ask to what extent, under actual policy, projections
of the evolution of inﬂation and output have satisﬁed the optimal target criteria stated
above. Answering this question requires, of course, that we estimate what the projected
future paths of the target variables should have been at various past dates. However, our
VAR characterization of the data over our sample period provides one way of generating
such projections. Here we propose to appraise how close actual policy has been to being
optimal by asking to what extent projections based on the VAR would have satisﬁed the
target criterion.
In our characterization of optimal policy above, there are actually three criteria that
63must be satisﬁed each period — one relating to the component of interest-rate policy that
cannot be forecasted even a quarter in advance, one relating to the component of policy
that is forecastable a quarter in advance but not earlier, and one relating to the component
of policy that can be anticipated two quarters in advance. The ﬁrst criterion, that the
evolution of interest rates satisfy (3.2) each period, is simplest to check, as long as we are
willing to assume that our VAR forecasts fully capture public information in a given quarter.
Figure 9 shows a plot of the actual (quarterly average) path of the federal funds rate over
our sample period, together with the VAR forecast using the previous quarter’s information
set.56 This allows a test of the degree to which condition (3.2) has been satisﬁed in practice.
We ﬁnd that under actual U.S. policy, variation in the U.S. federal funds rate has been
largely predictable; the gap between the two series in Figure 9 has a standard deviation of
only 65 basis points.57 This means that the identiﬁed monetary policy shocks, according to
the VAR analysis discussed in section 2, have been relatively small. This is what one should
expect, in a period in which the conduct of monetary policy has been fairly sensible.
The next condition for optimality that we consider is the short-term target criterion (3.3)
– (3.5). Figure 10 shows a plot of the historical path of the wage-adjusted inﬂation projection
that is targeted under this criterion, using the VAR forecasts to form this projection each
quarter, together with the path for the target value ¯ ¼t given by (3.5), also using the VAR
forecasts for the projections in the previous quarter. Figure 11 decomposes the variation in
both the adjusted inﬂation projection (3.3) and the time-varying target ¯ ¼t into the parts that
are due to variation in the inﬂation projections (at various horizons) on the one hand and the
56Note that here and below, the “quarter t information set” is taken to include ¼t+1;wt+1; and ˆ Yt+1; as
well as all variables dated t or earlier, on the ground that prices, wages, and output are all predetermined
variables according to our model. See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for further discussion.
57Of course, we are judging the forecastability of the funds rate using a VAR that has been ﬁt to this data
set, rather than considering the out-of-sample forecasting ability of a regression model estimated using only
data prior to the quarter for which the funds rate is being forecasted. We are also including variables in
the quarter t information set the values of which are not announced in quarter t (indeed, not even during
quarter t+1, though the measurements are made during that quarter), which also exaggerates the information
actually available in quarter t. But it must also be recognized that decisionmakers have access to a great
deal of information in quarter t that is not included in our data set, that might well allow better forecasting
of the funds rate than is possible on the basis of only the variables included in our VAR.










Figure 10: Testing whether actual U.S. policy has satisﬁed the short-run target criterion:
the adjusted inﬂation projection (3.3) compared with the optimal target given by (3.5).
parts that are due to variation in the real wage projections. We observe that a substantial
part of the quarter-to-quarter variation in the adjusted inﬂation projection is in fact due,
over this historical period, to variation in the real wage projection,58 though variation in the
real wage projection a quarter earlier appears to be less important as a source of variation
in the optimal target value.
Once again, the data are fairly consistent with this criterion for optimal policy. While
the wage-adjusted inﬂation projection has varied (according to the VAR) over a range of a
few percentage points, these variations have been fairly forecastable based on the previous
quarter’s information set, as required by the target criterion. The gap between the projection
and the target value has a standard deviation of only 48 basis points over this sample.
Of course, passing this test requires only that wage and price inﬂation, like the federal
58We have not attempted to quantify the share since the two components are not orthogonal.



















Figure 11: Decomposition of the variation in the short-run target criterion into parts due to
variation in inﬂation projections and real wage projections respectively.
funds rate, be highly forecastable a quarter in advance. It may accordingly be felt that it
is the inertial character of wage and price inﬂation that is conﬁrmed by Figure 10, rather
than something that depends much on monetary policy. It should also be noted that the
“target” series plotted in the ﬁgure only indicates how the right hand side of (3.5) has
varied over the sample period, under actual U.S. monetary policy, rather than the way
in which the target ¯ ¼t would have evolved under optimal monetary policy, given that the
inﬂation projections that determine this target would have been diﬀerent under a diﬀerent
sort of monetary policy. This latter sort of exercise would require that we solve for the
counterfactual equilibrium paths the endogenous variables under optimal policy, given the
historical sequence of exogenous shocks, as undertaken by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
We do not attempt such an exercise here.
66Testing the extent to which the historical data have satisﬁed the long-run target criterion
(3.6) – (3.7) is more complicated, because it requires the construction of projections for the
path of the output gap. The output gap is not directly observed, and our approach to the
estimation of the model in section 2 does not require us to commit ourselves to an empirical
proxy for the gap, despite the appearance of this variable in the model structural equations.
For in order to estimate the model parameters needed for our calculations thus far, we had
only to be able to compute the predicted impulse responses of prices, wages, output and
interest rates to a monetary disturbance. For this purpose, we could rely on the fact that,
according to our model, the output gap should equal ˆ Yt (detrended log output) minus a term
that is unaﬀected by monetary disturbances; there was no need to identify the time variation
in that latter term. Yet in order to evaluate the long-run target criterion at each date, we
need to be able to do so.
One possible approach is to use our estimated structural equations to infer the historical
sequence of disturbances from the residuals of the structural equations, using VAR forecasts
of the endogenous variables as proxies for the expectation terms in these equations, as do
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This approach can be used, however, only under strong
assumptions of debatable validity. The “natural rate of output” process that we are able to
infer from the residuals of our structural equations corresponds to the equilibrium level of
output under complete wage and price ﬂexibility.59 But this may or may not be the concept
of exogenously given potential output that should be used to deﬁne the welfare-relevant
“output gap” that appears in the loss function (3.1).
Under certain assumptions that are made precise in the appendix (and that have been
tacitly maintained thus far in our exposition), the “output gap” that appears in the structural
equations (2.11) and (2.14) as a source of inﬂationary pressure — without any additional
“cost-push shock” term of the kind routinely included in the models of section 1 — is exactly
59To be precise, it corresponds to the component of this variable that is forecastable a quarter in advance.
This is all that can be reconstructed from the paths of the endogenous variables, given that wages, prices and
output are all predetermined according to our model, but this is also what is relevant for the construction of
the variable xt that appears in our loss function (3.1), and hence the target criterion stated in the previous
section.
67the same variable as the distortion measure appearing in (3.1). Yet this need not be true in
general; time variation in distorting taxes or in the degree of market power in either labor
markets or goods markets, for example, will result in a time-varying wedge between the
ﬂexible-wage-and-price equilibrium level of output and the eﬃcient level of output, with the
result that the relevant output gap for the two purposes ceases to be the same.60 We can
allow for this extension of our framework by letting the gap between actual output and the
ﬂexible-wage-and-price equilibrium output be denoted xt+ut; as in equations (1.29) – (1.30)
above, where xt is the welfare-relevant output-gap concept (the variable that appears in the
welfare-theoretic loss function), while ut is a “cost-push disturbance” term.
In the case of the extended model, the method of Rotemberg and Woodford allows us to
construct an empirical proxy for the evolution of the series xt + ut, as this is what appears
in the wage- and price-setting equations. However, the projections that are required for
checking whether the target criterion is satisﬁed are projections for xt; the variable that
appears in the loss function (3.1). Further assumptions must be made in order to infer
what the projected variations in the welfare-relevant output gap should have been. These
assumptions are not testable within the context of the model and the small set of time series
used here.
One simple, though extreme, assumption, would be that the welfare-relevant concept
of potential output is a smooth trend, so that cyclical variation in ˆ Y n
t should be almost
entirely attributed to transitory variation in the cost-push term ut.61 In this case, it should
be more accurate to identify the welfare-relevant output gap with ˆ Yt; detrended output, than
with the series xt + ut inferred from the residuals of the structural equations. Under this
assumption, we can construct our output-gap projections using the VAR alone, without any
need reconstruct disturbances using the equation residuals.
We ﬁrst consider the conformity of historical policy with the optimal target criteria when
detrended output is considered an adequate proxy for the output gap. In Figure 12, we plot
60See Giannoni (2000) or Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for further discussion in the context of simpler models.
61This view is implicit in the output-gap measures commonly used in the literature on empirical central-
bank reaction functions.










Figure 12: Testing whether actual U.S. policy has satisﬁed the long-run target criterion: the
adjusted inﬂation projection (3.6) compared with the optimal target given by (3.7).
the historical series for the wage- and output-adjusted inﬂation projection that is targeted
under the long-term criterion (3.6) over our sample period, using the VAR forecasts for
inﬂation, the real wage, and detrended output, and the numerical weights given in section
3.2. (Since the constant ¼¤ in (3.7) is arbitrary, we assume a long-run inﬂation target equal
to 2:39% per annum, which corresponds to the long-run value average inﬂation rate under
historical policy, as implied by our estimated VAR.) Figure 13 similarly decomposes both
the projection and its optimal target value into their components due to variation over time
in inﬂation projections, real-wage projections, and output projections. Note that when the
output gap is measured in this way, the projected change in the output gap over a two-
quarter horizon is modest enough that terms of this kind are not responsible for too much
of the variation from quarter to quarter in either the adjusted inﬂation projection or in its
optimal target value. Instead, the target criterion is largely a function of the inﬂation and





















Figure 13: Decomposition of the variation in the long-run target criterion into parts due to
variation in inﬂation, real-wage, and output projections respectively.
real-wage projections (or alternatively, projected price and wage inﬂation).
This alternative (longer-run) adjusted inﬂation projection has also been relatively stable
over our historical sample, and once again, the gap between the target and the current
projection has never been large; the standard deviation of target misses in the case of this
criterion is only 52 basis points. However, target misses under this criterion have been
somewhat persistent, with a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.19. Thus we can identify periods
in which policy was consistently too loose or too tight for quarters at a time, according to
this criterion, though Fed policy never violated the criterion to too great an extent. Figure
14 plots the extent to which the adjusted inﬂation projection exceeded the target in each
quarter (the dashed line in the ﬁgure), together with a smoothed version of the same series
that makes the average tendency of U.S. policy clearer.62 One observes that policy was










Figure 14: The extent to which the adjusted inﬂation projection exceeded the optimal target
at various times. Dashed line shows the quarterly discrepancy, solid line a moving average.
consistently too tight (the adjusted inﬂation projection was too low) under this criterion in
the period 1981-82, too loose in much of the period 1983-89, a bit too tight again in the
period 1990-95, somewhat too loose in the late 1990s, and ﬁnally again consistently too tight
in the last 9 quarters of our sample. However, in none of these periods did the adjusted
inﬂation projection diﬀer consistently from the inﬂation projection for several quarters by
an amount greater than half a percentage point in either direction.
If, instead, we use the residuals from our structural equations to infer the evolution of the
output gap, the plots corresponding to Figures 12 and 13 instead look like those shown in
Figures 15 and 16. In this case, historical paths of both the adjusted inﬂation projection and
its optimal target value are more volatile. The change is due to the greater (and much more
62In the ﬁgure, the solid line is a two-sided moving average of the dashed line, equal to 1/3 the discrep-
ancy in that quarter, 2/9 of the discrepancy in both the preceding and following quarters, and 1/9 of the
discrepancy both two quarters earlier and two quarters later.











Figure 15: Alternative version of ﬁgure 12, using equation residuals to infer the variation in
the natural rate of output.
transitory) volatility of the output gap process that is inferred in this manner. As shown in
Figure 16, in this case the quarter-to-quarter variation in projected growth of the output gap
is an important factor resulting in variation in the adjusted inﬂation projection and in the
target value. Of course, the high volatility of (and high-frequency variation in) this series
may well suggest that it reﬂects mainly speciﬁcation error in the structural equations of our
wage-price block, rather than actual variation in the welfare-relevant output gap.63
In this case, the gap between the adjusted inﬂation projection and its optimal target
value (plotted in Figure 17) is also found to be fairly large in many individual quarters. The
standard deviation of the discrepancy using this measure of the output gap is nearly 1.80
percentage points. However, the target misses are extremely transitory in this case; their
63The fact that our model does relatively poorly at matching the dynamics of the estimated response of
inﬂation, as shown in Figure 6, does not give us much conﬁdence in this regard.























Figure 16: Alternative version of ﬁgure 13, using equation residuals to infer the variation in
the natural rate of output.
autocorrelation is actually negative (-0.53), indicating that a target overshoot one quarter
tends to have its sign reversed in the next quarter. Except again at the end of our sample,
there are no periods of time over which policy can be identiﬁed as having been consistently too
tight or too loose for several quarters in succession. However, if we smooth the discrepancy
series in the same way as in Figure 14 (again shown by the solid line in the ﬁgure), we obtain
very similar conclusions as before regarding the periods in which (and the degree to which)
U.S. policy should be judged to have been too tight or too loose on average.
Overall, a comparison between U.S. time series over the past twenty years and the criteria
for optimal policy discussed in the previous section do not indicate any gross discrepancy.
However, this may simply mean that the diagnostics proposed here are not very useful as a
way of diagnosing deviations from optimal policy in the historical record. We have plotted














Figure 17: Alternative version of ﬁgure 14, using equation residuals to infer the variation in
the natural rate of output.
only the time-variation in the optimal target criteria that would be implied by the variation
in lagged projections that has occurred, given the actual evolution of the U.S. time series,
rather than attempting to determine the variation in the target values that would have
occurred under optimal policy, given the historical disturbance processes. These two ways of
judging the historical time series might yield quite diﬀerent pictures. For our optimal target
criteria demand that certain adjusted inﬂation projections not be too diﬀerent than similar
projections have been in the quarter before; this will result in plots of projections and target
values that look fairly similar, regardless of the paths of the U.S. time series, as long as each
of our four variables has been relatively smooth (as is the case). Nonetheless, inﬂation and
other variables might have wandered for years at some distance from the levels that they
would have had under fully optimal responses to the historical disturbances.
744 Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to derive robustly optimal monetary policy rule for optimiz-
ing models of the monetary transmission mechanism that incorporate a number of common
features of recent empirical models: staggered wage- and price-setting, inﬂation inertia re-
sulting from automatic indexation of wages and prices to a lagged price index, predetermined
wage-setting, pricing and spending decisions, and habit persistence in the level of real pri-
vate expenditure. In this way, we have sought to show that the approach to the design of
optimal policy rules proposed by Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) can be applied to models
of practical interest.
In each of the cases that we have discussed, the optimal policy rule is a modiﬁed inﬂation-
forecast targeting rule. The optimal rule diﬀers from a simple (or “strict”) inﬂation target in
that projections of the future paths of variables other than goods-price inﬂation also receive
some weight in the target criterion — in particular, wage inﬂation, a measure of the output
gap, and nominal interest rates. Nonetheless, according to our numerical analysis in the
case of an estimated model of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism, the weight on
the inﬂation projection (in each of the two target criteria involved in our characterization
of optimal policy for that model) is strong enough that it makes sense to speak of optimal
policy as a (ﬂexible) inﬂation-forecast targeting procedure.
In our examples, the optimal rule also diﬀers from a simple inﬂation target (and even
from many simple examples of “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting” rules discussed in the literature)
in that the optimal target value for the modiﬁed inﬂation forecast should vary over time,
depending on current and recent past macroeconomic conditions. We have illustrated the
possible degree of history-dependence of an optimal inﬂation target by showing how our two
optimal target criteria would have varied in the U.S. over the past two decades, given our
VAR characterization of the U.S. time series and the parameters of our estimated structural
model. Even when we use detrended output as our proxy for the output gap (which results
in a less volatile output-gap series than the one implied by the residuals of our structural
75equations), and even over the relatively uneventful period 1984-2000, our analysis implies
that the optimal target criterion has varied from quarter to quarter over a range of several
percentage points.
Finally, we have shown, in the context of our empirical model, that an optimal policy may
be too complex in structure to be conveniently described by a single target criterion. Our
estimated model of the U.S. monetary transmission mechanism implies that optimal policy
must satisfy three distinct criteria — one that governs the way that interest rates in a given
quarter should respond to unexpected developments during that quarter; one that governs
the way in which the central bank’s commitment regarding interest rates in that quarter,
announced the quarter before, should respond to unexpected developments in the quarter
when the commitment is made; and still a third criterion that determines the component
of interest-rate policy that can be anticipated two quarters in advance. Nonetheless, the
decision procedure takes the form of an inﬂation-forecast targeting procedure, in which
(i) the instrument used to ensure satisfaction of the target criterion is the central bank’s
commitment regarding its interest-rate operating target for the following quarter, and (ii)
the inﬂation target each quarter is itself the product of a policy decision in the previous
quarter, also aimed at ensuring that a certain adjusted inﬂation projection satisﬁes a target
criterion.
Our optimal target criteria are a good bit more complex than the sort used by actual
inﬂation-targeting central banks, which typically specify a time-invariant inﬂation target and
a particular horizon at which it is to be reached (for example, RPIX inﬂation of 2.5 percent
at a horizon of 8 quarters in the future, in the case of the Bank of England). Our advocacy
of a more complex form of targeting rule is not meant to deny the desirability of having a
medium-term inﬂation target that remains the same even if the actual inﬂation rate may
depart from it temporarily. In the examples that we have considered, optimal policy almost
always involves a well-deﬁned long-run inﬂation target, to which the inﬂation rate should
be expected to return after each disturbance; and it is surely desirable for a central bank
to be explicit about this aspect of its policy commitment, in order to anchor the public’s
76medium-term inﬂation expectations.
Rather, we wish to suggest that it is insuﬃcient to specify no more of a policy commitment
than this. The mere fact that a central bank wishes to see inﬂation return to a rate of 2.5
percent at a horizon two years in the future is not suﬃcient to say which of the various
possible transition paths that reach that endpoint should be preferred. There will always
be a range of possible scenarios consistent with the terminal condition: for example, looser
policy this year to be compensated by tighter policy next year, or alternatively the reverse.
In practice, the Bank of England, like many other forecast-targeting banks, deals with this
problem by demanding that a constant-interest-rate forecast satisfy the terminal condition.
That is, the current level of overnight interest rates is held to be justiﬁed if a projection
under the assumption that that level of interest rates will be maintained implies that RPIX
inﬂation should equal 2.5 percent eight quarters in the future. However, this implies no
commitment to actually maintain interest rates at the current level over that period, or even
that interest rates are currently expected to remain at that level on average. (It is frequently
the case that the published constant-interest-rate projection would itself imply that interest
rates will need to be changed over the coming year, in order for the target criterion to be
satisﬁed by a constant-interest-rate projection under the conditions that are forecasted to
obtain by then.) It is thus hard to see how basing policy decisions on a forecast-targeting
exercise of this particular kind can be expected to serve the goals of making monetary policy
more transparent, or improving the degree to which policy is correctly anticipated by the
private sector.
The conceptually superior approach, surely, is to base policy on a projection that is
computed under the assumption that policy will be made in accordance with the targeting
rule in the future as well,64 so that the projection that is used to justify current policy will
correspond to the bank’s own best forecast of how it should act in the future, as in the case of
the projections used to justify policy decisions by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. It will,
of course, be necessary to stress that the bank’s only commitment is to the rule embodied
64See Svensson and Woodford (2003) for further discussion of what this would mean in practice.
77in this projection, not to the particular time path of interest rates indicated as most likely.
But given the use of “fan charts” to show that a variety of possible future scenarios can be
envisioned, depending on how various types of uncertainty happen to be resolved, it is not
clear why it should not be possible to talk about probability distributions for future interest
rates along with those for inﬂation and real activity, without giving rise to the appearance
of a more speciﬁc commitment than is intended.
Once this is done, however, it becomes necessary to specify a target criterion that can
determine the appropriate short-run dynamics for the economy, and not simply a terminal
condition for a date some years in the future. Such a criterion will accordingly place sub-
stantial weight on projections of the target variables over the coming year, as in the case of
the optimal target criteria derived in this chapter. It will also have to take a stand as to
the kinds of projected departures of real variables from their long-run average values that
justify short-run departures of the inﬂation projection from its long-run target value; it will
no longer suﬃce simply to specify what the (unchanging) long-run inﬂation target is. None
of the inﬂation-targeting central banks actually believe that it is desirable to keep inﬂation
as close as possible to the long-run target value at all times; this is why forecast-targeting
procedures only seek to ensure that inﬂation is projected to return to the target value after
many quarters.65 But by formulating no explicit doctrine as to the way in which one should
choose among alternative transition paths to that medium-term goal, they avoid having to
clarify the nature of acceptable trade-oﬀs among competing stabilization goals.66
A coherent approach — and in particular, one that could be justiﬁed as seeking to
implement the conditions for optimal policy discussed in this chapter — would instead have
to make explicit the kind of projections for output and other real variables that should justify
a modiﬁcation of the short-run inﬂation target, and the degree to which they should aﬀect it.
65On this point, see, e.g., Bernanke et al., 1999, or Svensson, 1999.
66The fact that a real GDP projection is always included along with the projection for RPIX inﬂation
in the introduction to the Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report — and in fact, is always discussed ﬁrst —
suggests that the some attention is paid to the projected path of output in deciding upon the appropriateness
of the current level of interest rates. But the Bank’s oﬃcial target criterion, involving only the constant-
interest-rate projection of RPIX inﬂation at the eight-quarter horizon, does not make explicit the way in
which the output projection should be taken into account.
78In all likelihood, the inﬂation-targeting banks have shied away from such explicitness out of a
suspicion that the types of circumstances that might reasonably justify short-term departures
from the inﬂation target are too various to be catalogued. But the theory developed here
has sought to show that it is possible to state short-run target criteria (criteria that apply
to the shortest horizon at which current policy decisions can still have an eﬀect) that will
be robustly optimal, meaning that the same criterion continues to determine the correct
degree of short-run departure from the long-run inﬂation target regardless of the nature of
the disturbance that may have occurred.
Much work remains to be done, of course, before a quantitative characterization of opti-
mal policy of the kind that we oﬀer in section 3 could be used in practical policy delibera-
tions. One of the most obvious issues requiring further study concerns the way in which a
central bank should take account of uncertainty about the correct model of the transmission
mechanism, as well as uncertainty in its evaluation of current macroeconomic conditions.
Uncertainty about the current state of the economy is relatively straightforward to deal
with, at least in principle. One can allow for partial information on the part of the central
bank in characterizing the optimal equilibrium responses to shocks, using methods similar
to those employed here, and derive an optimal target criterion that is valid in the presence of
partial information (Svensson and Woodford, 2002a, 2002b; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002b).
Because of the principle of certainty-equivalence in linear-quadratic policy problems of this
kind (discussed in detail by Svensson and Woodford), the optimal target criterion (once
correctly expressed) involves coeﬃcients that are independent of the degree of uncertainty in
central-bank estimates of the current state of the economy; however, the target may involve
variables that are not directly observed by the central bank, and must instead be estimated
using a Kalman ﬁlter.
Dealing with uncertainty about the numerical values of structural parameters (to say
nothing of more fundamental doubts about model speciﬁcation) is a much harder problem,
for which few general guidelines exist at present. Giannoni (2001, 2002) illustrates one
approach to the problem, for the case of uncertainty about the numerical values of the
79elasticities · and ¾ in a model similar to our baseline model (but in which an interest-
rate stabilization objective is assumed). For the particular kind of parameter uncertainty
considered, Giannoni ﬁnds that a concern for robustness (in the sense of guarding against
bad outcomes in the least-favorable case) should lead a central bank to choose a Taylor-style
interest-rate rule with stronger response coeﬃcients than it would choose on the basis of its
preferred estimates of the model parameters; this means allowing less variability of inﬂation
in equilibrium, at the cost of greater variability in nominal interest rates. This suggests that
a concern for robustness might justify targeting rules that are even closer to strict inﬂation
targeting than the optimal rules obtained in this paper; the question is surely one that
deserves further analysis.
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